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INTRODUCTION
The most prescient critic of uniform federal rules was not Thomas
Walsh, the Montana Senator whose dogged opposition almost single-
handedly prevented passage of the Act that enabled the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure." That honor belongs to Connor Hall, the West
Virginia lawyer who eight years before the Enabling Act became law
denounced both the proporents of the proposed legislation and the idea
of uniform federal rules.'
In 1926, the Editor of the American Bar Association Journal de-
clined to print a letter sent to him by Hall. In the letter, Hall noted he
had not heard:
a single sound reason for this bill. Its sponsors say that it
will promote uniformity, simplicity, speedier decisions and
decisions upon the merits. As to whether it will promote
speed and decisions upon the merits depends, of course, upon
the second, that is, whether it will promote simplicity. Any
consideration of the subject may, therefore, be confined to the
two arguments of uniformity and simplicity.'
t Professor, Northeastern University School of Law. A.B. 1958, LL.B. 1963,
Harvard University. I wish to thank my friend and colleague, Professor Judy Brown,
for once again pruning with insight and humor. This article is adapted from a presen-
tation given at the 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, held at
Northeastern University School of Law, October 7-8, 1988.
1 On Walsh's opposition, see, e.g., Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1063-65, 1081-95 (1982); Chandler, Some Major Advances
in the Federal Judicial System 1922-1947, 31 F.R.D. 307, 481-82 (1963); Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in His-
torical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 996-98 (1987).
' My claim for Hall's prescience is based on his ten-page letter. See Copy of
manuscript of Connor Hall (Oct. 15, 1926) mailed to the Editor, American Bar Associ-
ation Journal, requesting publication [hereinafter Hall], reprinted in Thomas J.
Walsh Papers, Library of Congress, Box 302, Legislative File 1913-1933, "Procedure
Bill" ca. 1926 [hereinafter Walsh Papers]. This manuscript was later published as
Hall, Uniform Law Procedure in Federal Courts, 33 W. VA. L.Q. 131 (1927).
' Hall, supra note 2, at 1-2. The editor of the American Bar Association Journal
at the time was Major Edgar B. Tolman, who later was appointed Secretary to the
Supreme Court Advisory Committee. See Subrin, supra note 1, at 970-71. On Tol-
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Hall continued by asking why uniformity was desired in the dis-
trict courts of the United States, stating, "[w]e should be shown in what
way uniformity will promote justice. Unless it is to promote justice,
then it is useless."' Hall further added that:
sponsors of the bill, however, speak of uniformity as if it
were some excellence in itself, something transcendental and
absolute; or at least as an undoubted blessing, as health,
happiness or virtue. No reason is given why uniformity, if
attained, would be of advantage to any litigant, though it
might be to some lawyers. 5
It is appropriate that we address Hall's questions about proce-
dural uniformity during this fiftieth anniversary commemoration. To-
day we see a proliferation of local rules in federal district courts,6 the
failure of half of the states to adopt the Federal Rules,7 and the acceler-
ation of amendments to the Federal Rules.' These factors compel ex-
ploration of the goals and implementation of interdistrict court and in-
trastate procedural uniformity. We must also examine another concept
of uniformity: namely, the assumption that the same procedural rules
should apply to all types of cases or, as Professor David Shapiro has
cautioned, that the same options or uniform procedural smorgasbord be
available for all types of civil suits.9 Case management,' 0 tracking sys-
tems," and the idea of a multi-door courthouse offering alternative
man's refusal to publish the letter, see Letter from Joseph R. Taylor, Managing Edi-
tor, to Hall (Oct. 29, 1926), reprinted in Walsh Papers, supra note 2. For Hall's
spirited rejoinder to the rejection, see Letter from Hall to Mr. Joseph R. Taylor (Nov.
10, 1926), reprinted in Walsh Papers, supra note 2. It ends: "It is of very little interest
to me personally whether any of my views are published in the Journal, but it should
be of great interest to you and the American Bar Association that its Journal be main-
tained as a genuine, honest, open forum." Id.
' Hall, supra note 2, at 2.
SId.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 98-116.
' See infra text accompanying notes 152-54.
' See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 1, at 1018-20; infra text accompanying note 122
(discussing the impact of the 1980 and 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure on the discovery process).
' In conversations with the author, Professor Shapiro has pointed out that true
trans-substantive procedure would necessitate that each case have the same procedures;
under the Federal Rules, lawyers are given leeway in many matters to decide which of
the many Federal Rule procedures they choose to use. This is particularly true with
respect to discovery. Even in a matter such as pleading, the Rules usually permit law-
yers to decide how much of the story to tell. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring
only a "short and plain" statement of a claim for relief).
'0 For discussion'of case management, see generally Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A
Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969 (1989)
(examining whether Rule 16 has met the objectives of rulemakers).
" See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
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modes of dispute resolution12 are each a cause and effect of new think-
ing about "trans-substantive" uniformity."3 And all of these phenomena
raise a final uniformity question: how can procedure most effectively
aid the predictable application of substantive law and thus help to
achieve uniformity of result in similar cases?
Connor Hall was correct. The proponents of the Enabling Act
often talked of procedural uniformity as if it were a transcendental
good whose inherent value required no explanation. The indefatigable
A.B.A. propagandist for the Enabling Act, Thomas Shelton of Virginia,
spoke of uniform federal procedure with religious fervor. 4 When the
proponents of the Enabling Act and the Federal Rules talked and wrote
about uniformity they either explicitly or implicitly utilized several in-
terconnected themes: efficiency, professionalization, federalism or na-
tionalism, effective law application, power, and politics. 5
Let us first look at the arguments advanced for uniformity and the
responses of Thomas Walsh and Connor Hall. We will then examine
the effect on procedural uniformity of federal local rules and state re-
luctance to adopt the federal rules. In doing so, we will rediscover the
apparent intractability of problems in the search for a sensible proce-
dural system, and the folly of "quick fix" procedural solutions. More-
over, there are other important lessons to learn for those who think that
bringing the rule of fair and compassionate laws to bear on the human
experience in a predictable and efficient manner is a worthy goal. The
local rule and state divergence from procedural uniformity suggests
that, without fanfare, we have already taken our first tentative steps
into a new era in American civil procedure.
12 See generally Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976)
(discussing alternatives to conventional litigation).
13 Robert M. Cover used the term "trans-substantive" in Cover, For James Wm.
Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 732-40 (1975)
(discussing the benefits of and problems with applying a single set of procedural rules
to a myriad of substantive claims). I do not recall seeing the term previously used.
14 For the part played by Shelton in the uniform federal rules movement, see
Subrin, supra note 1, at 948-61. Shelton compiled many of his writings about courts
and procedural matters in T. SHELTON, SPIRIT OF THE COURTS (1918). Here is a
typical statement by Shelton on the importance of uniform procedure: "Uniformity of
legislation is a necessary convenience, but uniformity of administration is a fundamen-
tal necessity. . . ." Id. at 40.
15 Similar themes appear in the Field Code reform movement. See Subrin, David
Dudley Field and The Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural
Vision, 6 LAW & HIsT. REV. 311, 316-23 (1988).
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I. THE MANY FACES OF UNIFORMITY
A. The Pro-Uniformity Argument
Twentieth-century proponents of uniform federal procedural rules
typically began by attacking the lack of uniformity caused by the Con-
formity Act of 1872. The Act required (excepting equity and admiralty
cases) that the civil procedure in each federal trial court conform "as
near as may be" with that of the state in which it sat. 6 Thomas
Shelton and others argued that nonconformity existed because many
federal procedural statutes and practices took precedence over conform-
ity with state law; in such cases the federal judges correctly refused to
apply inferior state procedures.1
7
The pro-uniform procedural rules advocates argued that the al-
leged nonconformity caused the following inefficiencies: 1) the waste in
time and money of judges and lawyers trying to ascertain when in a
particular federal district court to conform or not to conform to state
procedure;'" 2) the time and expense of appealing such decisions;' 9 and
3) the cost to clients, particularly corporations engaged in interstate
6 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, 197. Shelton's 1911 A.B.A.
resolution began: "Whereas, Section 914 of the Revised Statutes [the Conformity Act of
1872] has utterly failed to bring about a general uniformity in federal and state pro-
ceedings in civil cases .... " 37 A.B.A. REP. 434, 434 (1912); Burbank, supra note 1,
at 1049 n.151.
17 See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 6 A.B.A. J.
509, 513-14, 525-27 (1920) [hereinafter 1920 Rep. Comm. Unif. Jud. Pro.]; Burbank,
supra note 1, at 1067-68 ("From 1920 through 1929, the core of the ABA Committee's
annual report remained the same from year to year."); McDowell, Some Misapprehen-
sions as to Federal Procedure and Jurisdiction, 21 VA. ST. B.A. REP. 351, 370-71
(1908); Shelton, Uniform Judicial Procedure-Let Congress Set the Supreme Court
Free, 73 CENT. L.J. 319, 321-22 (1911); see also A. DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 584-88 (1928).
18 See supra note 16; see also S. REP. No. 892, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1917)
[hereinafter 1917 SENATE REPORT].
That cases should be delayed month after month, and sometimes year after
year, should be reversed and tried and retried, upon mere matters of prac-
tice that in no way touch the essential merits, is one of the reproaches in
the administration of the law which has had a greater tendency to bring
the practices of the courts into disrepute than any other thing.
Id.
19 Opponents of the Conformity Act often cited to the large number of procedural
points that were dealt with on appeals. See, e.g., 1917 SENATE REPORT, supra note 18,
at 3 ("[Tlhe time of the . . . appellate tribunals has been very largely taken up not in
deciding the case but in endeavoring to ascertain the way to be followed in order to
reach the point where a decision can be made at all."). One author mentioned the
difficulty of federal circuit court judges in circuits that comprised many states, for
under the Conformity Act they had to apply state procedure with which they had little
familiarity. See Lile, Uniform Procedure at Law in the Federal Courts, 76 CENT. L.J.
214, 214 (1913).
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commerce, of having to retain different lawyers or law firms in federal
courts in different states, since experts on the state procedure were
required.20
Shelton also argued that the state legislatures had amended state
procedural statutes haphazardly. As a result, state court procedure, to
which federal judges had to conform, was unduly complicated, unscien-
tific and, "uncorrelated." 21 In other words, the procedure governing
each stage of litigation, such as pleading, joinder, and discovery, did not
sensibly or efficiently relate to the other phases.22
Shelton also made a more straightforward quality-of-justice argu-
ment, the importance of deciding like cases in a like manner, which he
tied to the needs of the business community:
Commerce is the life blood of any country, the only measure
of its prosperity and success, and the government that best
maintains it, is best. Mindful of these things, it is with inter-
est that one observes the organization and working of three
great civil agencies looking to uniformity in statute, uniform-
ity in procedure and uniformity in decision, all under the
control of the American Bar Association. They are the
"Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law," the
"Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure" and the "In-
terstate Conference of Judges." They give an assurance of
interstate judicial relations as fixed, necessary and useful as
fixed interstate commercial relations.2"
Most proponents did not emphasize this "uniformity of result"
20 See, e.g., Simplification of Judicial Procedure: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res.
552 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong., 1st Sess.
13-14 (1915) [hereinafter 1915 Senate Hearings] (Statements of Thomas Shelton).
21 See, e.g., T. SHELTON, supra note 14, at xxi-xxx. For examples of the frequent
use of the word "correlated," see id. at 13, 33, 42; see also H.R. REP. No. 462, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914) [hereinafter 1914 HOUSE REPORT]; 1920 Rep. Comm. Unif
Jud. Pro., supra note 17, at 516.
2 The assertion that the new uniform federal rule procedure would be "corre-
lated" often accompanied an assertion or inference that legislative amendments to pro-
cedure, combined with the other sources of procedure, produced a bad result. See, e.g.,
1914 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 13 ("It does not permit of argument that
judicial procedure should be a complete, scientific, correlated system instead of a patch-
work of disconnected statutes, decisions, rules, and common law."); see also 1920 Rep.
Comm. Unif. Jud. Pro., supra note 17, at 516 (benefits to be achieved if uniform
judicial procedure were adopted include court rule in lieu of statutory or common law
procedure, allowing the foundation for fixed interstate judicial relations).
22 T. SHELTON, supra note 14, at 147-48; see also Shelton, An American Com-
mon Law in the Making-The Habit of Thinking Uniformity, 30 LAw NOTES 50, 52
(1926) (arguing that "[tihere is no more excuse for differing judicial procedure than for
differing languages in the several States").
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theme. Perhaps, as we will see, this reluctance derived from the theme's
tension with the simple and flexible rules the proponents also
espoused.24
The commercial need rationale was usually linked to an argument
that the states had become more interrelated by the telephone, tele-
graph, train, and airplane.2 5 A 1928 Senate Judiciary Committee Mi-
nority Report favoring uniform federal rules asserted that:
State lines have not to-day the persuasive force of a hundred
or fifty years ago. The development of the economic re-
sources of the country has brought with it problems that
know no boundaries, and a growing consciousness of the
commercial necessity for national uniformity both in law and
its administration. 6
Yet another aspect of the uniformity theme concerned professional-
ism and was inextricably bound to the efficiency, quality-of-justice, and
nationalism arguments. The Enabling Act proponents believed that
lawyers and judges were unfairly criticized because procedural law was
so "unscientific" and confusing. They blamed the state legislatures,
which continually passed unnecessary procedural amendments, and the
federal Congress, which would not authorize the Supreme Court to
pass a modern, uniform procedure. 27 Further, Enabling Act proponents
contended, the complex procedure permitted unethical lawyers, known
as "procedural sharps," to take advantage of the system, further dimin-
ishing the profession's prestige.2 Several pro-Enabling Act enthusiasts
even claimed that bad procedural rules caused some citizens to turn to
Bolshevism.29
The professionalism theme included financial aspects. Lawyers
who represented corporations which did business in several states could
not with ease practice law in the federal courts of each state.30 Shelton
24 For a discussion of Shelton's shift from the theme of valuing fixed procedure
because it constricts the discretion of judges and helps produce more predictable results
to a position arguing for flexible procedure granting great discretion to judges, see Sub-
rin, supra note 1, at 949-61.
25 See, e.g., T. SHELTON, supra note 14, at 29.
28 S. REP. No. 440, pt. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1928) [hereinafter 1928 SEN-
ATE REPORT].
27 See, e.g., T. SHELTON, supra note 14, at xx-xxix; Shelton, supra note 17, at
321-22.
28 See, e.g., 1915 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 12; 1914 HousE REPORT,
supra note 21, at 7 (quoting Senator Elihu Root). For a related theme, see generally
Cockrill, The Shyster Lawyer, 21 YALE L.J. 383 (1912) (examining the origin and
present-day conception of the shyster).
29 See Subrin, supra note 1, at 955 & n.274, 959 & n.290.
"0 See, e.g., 1915 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 14; T. SHELTON, supra note
[Vol. 137:1999
1989] FEDERAL RULES, LOCAL RULES, AND STATE RULES
bitterly complained that he could not even be admitted to practice in
the federal courts of New York City: "[t]hese are what are called
United States courts, but instead I call them New York City courts.""1
Proponents also regretted that clients, particularly businessmen, were
turning from courts to arbitrators, allegedly as a result of the proce-
dural quagmire.
3 2
The "uniformity" and "simplicity" arguments that Connor Hall
placed at the heart of the pro-Enabling Act position were interrelated.
The lack of uniformity of procedure in federal courts exemplified the
lack of simplicity. 3 Another example was that in federal court one ap-
plied Federal Equity Rules to equity cases, while on the law side one
applied the hodgepodge of state-federal procedural law. 4 Uniform fed-
eral rule enthusiasts cited statistics of the high percentage of procedural
issues on appellate dockets, asserting that procedure kept substantive
law from being applied. 8
Uniform, simple procedural rules for the federal courts implies
centralized rulemaking. Proponents blamed legislatures for the present
unsatisfactory scheme. They contended that some expert and trusted
body-such as the Supreme Court3 8-should be entrusted with the task
of drafting simple rules. Shelton ironically spoke about the "sublime
faith" that "abides in people of this country" for what he called "their
highest tribunal,"37 at a time when many Americans viewed the Court
as an obstacle to social legislation passed for their benefit.38
Choosing the Supreme Court as rulemaker led proponents to the
argument that the Enabling Act, unlike the Conformity Act, would re-
14, at 33-34.
31 1915 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 13.
" See Subrin, supra note 1, at 960 n.295.
33 See, e.g., 1917 SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, which starts with criticism of
the Conformity Act, and ends:
If this bill shall be passed, the Supreme Court will adopt rules of so sim-
ple and workable a character that they will constitute models for the vari-
ous States, with the result that in the course of a few years we shall have a
uniform system of simple procedure in operation in all the courts of the
country, Federal and State, alike.
The title of the Report was "Simplification of Judicial Procedure in Federal Courts."
" See, e.g., C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING, 31-34 (2d
ed. 1947).
11 See, e.g., 1917 SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 3-4; T. SHELTON, supra
note 14, at 257-59.
11 See 1917 SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 6; supra note 27 and accompany-
ing text.
T. SHELTON, supra note 14, at 35.
38 See, e.g., 2 H. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT
572-74 (1964); 17 T. ROOSEVELT, THE WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 5-22 (Na-
tional ed. 1926) (speech at Osawatomie, Kansas, Aug. 31, 1910).
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sult in intrastate uniformity. The Supreme Court would promulgate
such sound and simple rules that each state would copy them. 9
Concerns about uniformity also raised issues about the relation-
ship between procedure and substance. It is logically possible that one
could have the same procedural rules in all federal courts, but that
those rules would not be trans-substantive. There could be different
procedural rules for different substantive cases. For example, the plead-
ing requirements required in antitrust cases might differ from those in
automobile tort suits.
Under the evolving uniformity and simplicity ideology such a non-
trans-substantive procedural methodology could not develop. A bias
against procedural linedrawing inhered within the system. It was
thought that definitional or confining procedure caused needless dis-
putes over distinctions and lines, and interfered with cases getting heard
on the merits.40 Also, a scheme attempting to integrate substance and
process would imply a relationship between the two which would have
made it difficult to persuade Congress to confer such power upon the
courts. This was especially true from 1911 through 1930 when Ena-
bling Act proposals were presented to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
many of whose members distrusted the conservative Supreme Court.4
Finally, the Supreme Court could not, particularly in a brief period,
have drafted non-trans-substantive rules. That task would have re-
quired extensive hearings and reflection to try to mesh procedure and
substance. It would have raised sensitive political questions concerning
the rationale for applying different procedure to different types of cases.
This "uniform federal rules" theme ended up with four strands:
interdistrict court uniformity, intrastate uniformity, trans-substantive
uniformity, and, although this was not stressed, uniformity of result.
39 See, e.g., 1920 Rep. Comm. Unif. Jud. Pro., supra note 17, at 516; supra note
33.
- 40 See Subrin, supra note 1, at 961-65 (discussing the procedural views of Charles
E. Clark, the Reporter of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee that drafted the
Federal Rules).
4' Senator Walsh, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee throughout this
period, was instrumental in defeating Enabling Act bills for two decades. See supra
note 1 and accompanying text. He included the conservative nature of the Supreme
Court as an argument against the uniform federal procedural bill. See e.g., Views of the
Minority from the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 892, 64th Cong., 2d
Sess. pt. 2, at 5 (1917) [hereinafter 1917 SENATE REPORT, Part 2] ("The Supreme
Court of the United States is, by its very constitution, conservative . . . [T]he justices
have [no] opportunity, from their own experience and observation, to know whether the
system as a whole or in any detail works satisfactorily or not.").
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B. The Walsh-Hall Critique
Thomas Walsh, the progressive Democratic senator from Mon-
tana, was the chief opponent of uniform federal rules from 1912, when
he was elected Senator, until his death in 1933.42 Walsh never conceded
the failure of the Conformity Act. He thought conformity with state
procedural law worked quite well for the vast majority of lawyers, and
was certainly better than uniform federal rules which would require
lawyers to learn two sets of procedures-one for federal court and one
for state.
4 3
Walsh was perhaps correct that the Conformity Act did not lead to
the quagmire that the pro-uniformity forces claimed. During the 1880s,
when David Dudley Field and others proposed a uniform federal pro-
cedural rules reform, many who resisted maintained that the Conform-
ity Act worked properly and aided local lawyers." Walsh, who had
been a successful trial lawyer in Montana, contended that although
there were occasions when federal judges chose not to conform to state
procedure, the exceptions were predictable and well known to the
bar.45 In 1926, he took an informal poll of federal judges. Of the forty
clearcut responses, twenty-six, or sixty-five percent, favored the Con-
formity Act over the Enabling Act proposal.46
Walsh further argued that the pro-uniform rules enthusiasts de-
veloped their "simplicity" argument only after their uniformity argu-
42 See sources discussed supra note 1. Ironically, Walsh's death in 1933, after
Franklin Delanor Roosevelt had selected him to be Attorney General, permitted Homer
Cummings to succeed him. Cummings subsequently resurrected the Enabling Act bill.
See Burbank, supra note 1, at 1095-96.
"I See 1915 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 27 (statement of Thomas Walsh,
quoting from a speech given at a Montana Bar Association meeting); see also, Simplifi-
cation of Judicial Procedure in Federal Courts: Hearing on S. 1011, 1012, 1546,
2610, and 2870 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th
Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1922) [hereinafter 1922 Senate Hearings] (Statement of Thomas
Walsh); Walsh, Reform of Federal Procedure, Address Delivered at Meeting of Tri-
State Bar Assn. at Texarkana, Ark.-Tex. (Apr. 23, 1926), reprinted in S. Doc. No.
105, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1926) [hereinafter Walsh, Texarkana Address] (also
attached to S. REP. No. 440, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-15 (1928)); Walsh, Rule-making
Power on the Law Side of Federal Practice, 13 A.B.A. J. 87, 87 (1927) [hereinafter
Walsh, Rule-making] (address given at the annual meeting of the Oregon Bar
Association).
" See Subrin, supra note 1, at 943 n.200.
4 See e.g., 1922 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 15-16 (Walsh) ("[Under the
Conformity Act the state court practitioner] has only a very little to learn in order to be
equally skillful in the Federal court."); Walsh, Texarkana Address, supra note 43, at
3 ("[Iln most instances the inapplicability [of state procedure] is perfectly obvious.").
46 See Subrin, supra note 1, at 958 n.284; see also 38 A.B.A. REP. 34-44 (1913)
(comments of Moorfield Storey of Massachusetts and Warren E. Lloyd of California
speaking against an ABA-sponsored uniform rules bill, indicating that in 1913 the lack
of conformity was not a big problem; others who spoke disagreed).
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ment had "proven fatally weak."4 They were, Walsh suggested, pri-
marily seeking to replace an intrastate uniformity that helped most
lawyers with an interstate uniformity in federal courts, which would
help only the few lawyers who practiced in the federal courts of more
than one state. Walsh applauded the uniform state laws movement, but
denied that procedural uniformity would aid substantive uniformity.4
The notion that the new procedure would be simple and interpretation-
free was "utterly chimerical." '49 Indeed, it was "axiomatic. . .that it is
beyond human ingenuity or talent to frame statutes or rules suited to
every contingency expressed in language concerning the interpretation
of which no controversy of substance may arise." 50
Walsh doubted that flexible equity rules were simple for the prac-
titioner, and rejected the position that they should form a model for
procedure in all cases. He pointed out that equity practice required
lengthy treatises and a trial bar that specialized in equity suits.51
Walsh thought that Field had done a remarkable job, and that the
Code worked well in Montana, but he noted that many states had not
agreed. He believed it was unlikely, therefore, that all states would
agree to follow a new set of federal rules.52 Conditions around the
country varied and different regions needed different procedures. More-
over, according to Walsh, there were many important procedural mat-
ters about which there would not be national agreement. 3
After a trip to England, Walsh concluded that culture and man-
ners influenced the efficiency with which lawsuits were processed more
than did procedural rules. For instance, he attributed the relative speed
of English litigation to the practice of announcing rulings immediately
from the bench, as well as the reluctance of English judges to counte-
nance delay.
54
47 1917 SENATE REPORT, Part 2, supra note 41, at 2-3.
4 See Walsh, Texarkana Address, supra note 43, at 8 ("I inquire again, what is
the substantial gain to be anticipated from this departure [from state procedure]?").
'" See 1917 SENATE REPORT, Part 2, supra note 41, at 4; see also Walsh, Rule-
making, supra note 43, at 89 ("[Field] advocated the adoption of a new system of
simple rules that no one could misunderstand and he believed that out of it no ques-
tions of practice could conceivably arise. Now that idea is perfectly chimerical.").
50 Walsh, Texarkana Address, supra note 43, at 3.
5' See 1915 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 12; Walsh, Texarkana Address,
supra note 43, at 5.
52 See Walsh, Texarkana Address, supra note 43, at 8.
See id. at 6-8 (citing as examples limitations of actions, provisional remedies,
and jury selection); Walsh, Rule-making, supra note 43, at 90.
" See Walsh, Texarkana Address, supra note 43, at 11-13 (citing as examples
that English lawyers rarely object to the admission of evidence and that juries usually
consist of the first 12 persons called); Letter from Thomas Walsh to Mr. and Mrs.
Hutchens (Oct. 5, 1925), reprinted in Walsh Papers, supra note 2 (concluding that "it
is the habits of our bar that need reforming, not the laws under which they act").
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Walsh thought that the Supreme Court had neither the time nor
the institutional competence to draft uniform rules for all trial courts.
He argued that the Justices were conservative and old, and far removed
from both the populace and from the trial courts. He further believed
that enactment of procedural rules was properly a legislative and not a
judicial function.55
Connor Hall, a West Virginia lawyer, used several of Walsh's ar-
guments,56 but he added speculative and jurisprudential arguments es-
chewed by the more practical politician. Hall predicted the impact of
the proposed "reform" upon the profession.
[A] firm in a great city may represent a railroad, or an in-
dustrial company doing business in many states[;] if the pro-
cedure in the Federal Courts is uniform this city firm can,
itself, conduct the main parts of the litigation and reduce the
local lawyers substantially to filing clerks and advisors on
jurors. Uniformity, therefore, increases the influence and im-
portance of the great city firm, having at its head, perhaps,
some business man masquerading as a lawyer, with his part-
ners of first and second magnitude, law clerks, process serv-
ers, runners, etc.; would correspondingly reduce local prac-
tice, local ability and local pride and drive the practice of
law further on the downward road from a profession to a
business.. . . Uniformity would further augment the impor-
tance of large aggregations of men and depress the
individual. .... 57
Hall gave several reasons why uniform federal rules would not
result in a uniform procedure. He noted how the idea of general, non-
Walsh also pointed out how small England is relative to the size of the United States.
See Walsh, Texarkana Address, supra note 43, at 6 ("half that of the state of
Montana").
" See 1917 SENATE REPORT, Part 2, supra note 41, at 5-6; Walsh, Texarkana
Address, supra note 43, 9-10 (arguing that if the task had to be given to the judiciary,
district judges were the better choice). But see Walsh, Rule-making, supra note 43, at
91:
Now I want it distinctly understood that I am making no argument
whatever against the system of rules prescribed by a court [of a single
state] as against laws enacted by the legislature. If the people of the state
of Oregon believe that the Supreme Court of the state of Oregon can more
wisely act upon such a matter than can their legislature, I shall have not
fault to find.
5 See Hall, supra note 2, at 4, 6-7, 9.
5 Id. at 2.
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rigorous, "simple" rules was at odds with true uniformity.
[I]f the rules are not to make provision for the various con-
tingencies of litigation, but are to be exceedingly simple,
questions would be continually arising before the District
Judge for which there was no rule.
We can not ignore the fact that questions, and numer-
ous, will arise. . . . How will the District Judge decide? By
what will he be guided? The answer is not doubtful. He will
turn to the system in which he has been trained and with
which he is already familiar, to-wit, the State practice ...
At the end of, say a generation, the practice would probably
have reached about the same conformity with State practice
as is now observed. 8
Moreover, in Hall's view, uniformity of equity procedure in Eng-
land and the federal courts occurred not because of rules, but because
uniform practices already existed when the Equity Rules became law.5 9
Hall noted that the size and diversity of America, compared with Eng-
land, made uniformity difficult to achieve."0
Hall was most perspicacious when he discussed the nature of pro-
cedure and its relationship to the concept of "simplicity," cautioning
that using rules to achieve simplicity and lack of technicality "is a will-
o'-the wisp."
All sorts of questions will, and do, arise in the course of liti-
gation, and we can not avoid them by pretending that they
do not exist. Many of these questions, perhaps, are not im-
portant, but some are important. Even so, in hotly contested
litigation the unimportant ones will be pressed, and certainly
the important ones are effective in a very practical way upon
the substantive right. It is futile to pretend otherwise.6
Hall did not understand how the proponents of uniform rules
thought they could reduce procedural problems just by changing the
rules. He declared:
Practice is a mere tool, but in any system of government,
having anything like a guaranty of private rights and a judi-
ciary of integrity and consistency, there must be a way to
bring causes to the attention of the court; to adduce proof; to
58 Id. at 3.
5 See id. at 3-4.
o See id. at 4.
61 Id. at 4.
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bear argument; to conclude the cause; to give the proper
judgment; to take the proper steps for enforcing it ....
Jack Cade (or can it possibly be Jack Code?) thought all of
this was very easy and that lawyers were merely perverse,
but any lawyer knows that it is difficult and often necessarily
intricate and complicated. We can not ignore the importance
of a settled and fair procedure. . . Stability, even in proce-
dure, is highly desirable. It is a maxim that nothing is worse
than variable and uncertain law.62
Senator Thomas Walsh and lawyer Connor Hall have left us with
a legacy. Hall was skeptical of interdistrict court uniformity because of
the nature of the federal judiciary and the inevitable gaps that appear
in general, simple rules. He was certain that faced with such general-
ity, judges would fall back upon their local experiences. Walsh was
skeptical of interstate uniformity, not ,only because of the nonuniversal
adoption of the Field Code, but also because of the variations among
different regions and traditions. Both thought that the underlying legal
culture was more important to procedural simplicity and uniformity
than were the rules themselves. Both were certain of the difficulty of
enacting codes that would materially decrease the need for interpreta-
tion. Neither thought equity rules and practice were as simple and easy
to apply as the proponents said. Walsh, particularly early on, ques-
tioned the competence of the Supreme Court to make procedural rules
for the trial courts. Hall insisted that procedural rules can be critical to
substantive results.
It is within the context of these predictions that we examine the
theme of uniformity, and its companion, simplicity, fifty years after the
Federal Rules became law.
II. LOCAL RULES: WILD FLOWERS IN THE GARDEN
A. Drafting Rule 83: the Local Rules Provision
In the original version of the Federal Rules, Rule 83 provided:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges
thereof may from time to time make and amend rules gov-
erning its practice not inconsistent with these rules. . . . In
all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may reg-
ulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with
62 Id. at 5-6.
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these rules."3
This crack in the wall of uniformity has become a gaping hole.
District court local rulemaking power had been explicitly granted
to the trial courts from their birth in 1789 until 1872.4 The Conform-
ity Act of 1872 reflected Congress's desire to severely limit this power.
The requirement of the Act to conform to state practice was followed
by the proviso, "any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding
"65
Despite the "notwithstanding" clause, letters sent to the advisory
committee in 1935 imply that local rules under the Conformity Act had
become an important part of the procedural landscape. Commentators
disagreed about the extent to which this should continue under the new
Enabling Act. For example, a judge of the Southern District of New
63 308 U.S. 765 (1939) (setting forth rule as promulgated in 1938). The rule has
been supplemented over the years, but this language remains unchanged.
At the time of the adoption of the Federal Rules, district courts were already
authorized by statute to make local rules not inconsistent with law or with any rule
prescribed by the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 731 (1934). This, and similar sec-
tions dealing with other United States courts, are consolidated in the current section
2071, which provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Con-
gress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules
shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed
by the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982).
This statute was supplemented by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Jus-
tice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 403, 102 Stat. 4642, 4650-51 (1988), to require "ap-
propriate public notice and an opportunity for comment" before rules are prescribed,
and to subject rules prescribed by district courts to review by the judicial council of the
relevant circuit to ensure consistency with the Federal Rules.
" See J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 117
(1977).
68 Act to Further the Administration of Justice, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197
(1872). However, there continued in statute the language that became 28 U.S.C. § 731
(1934), providing that:
The district courts may, from time to time, and in any manner not incon-
sistent with any law of the United States, or with any [equity] rule pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court ...make rules and orders directing the
returning of writs and processes, the filing of pleadings, the taking of
rules, the entering and making up of judgments by default, and other mat-
ters in vacation, and otherwise regulate their own practice as may be nec-
essary or convenient for the advancement of justice and the prevention of
delays in proceedings.
According to Professor Armistead M. Dobie, who was on the original advisory
committee:
The Conformity Act and this rule-making statute must be construed to-
gether. Though the Conformity Act ends with the phrase "any rule of the
court to the contrary notwithstanding," it is quite clear that the power of
the District Courts to make rules on the subjects mentioned in the rule-
making statute is not nullified by the Conformity Act.
A. DOIE, supra note 17, at 587.
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York wrote: "I trust that the Supreme Court will construe the [Ena-
bling Act] statute as entitling the district courts to make local rules
adapted to the needs of their several communities." But an Indiana
committee suggested "[tihat the field left to local rules be definitely de-
limited." A South Dakota district court judge wrote: "I recognize the
desirability of the uniformity of the procedure in the several District
Courts and believe practically all procedural matters should be covered
by general rules, [and] local rules should be reduced to a minimum." 6
The drafts and deliberations of the advisory committee show that
the drafters saw a necessity for local rules to meet local conditions and
for some body of law to fill the gaps not covered by the Federal Rules.
The first draft prepared by Charles Clark, the reporter, suggested that
the committee consider whether local rules could not only supplement
the Federal Rules, but also change them. He explained: "Some such
provision affording flexibility to the rules is necessary if they are to be
adjusted easily and without friction to the differing habits and customs
of lawyers throughout the country."67
During the deliberations, committee members initially had two as-
sumptions: first, that the Federal Rules, plus local rules, would cover
most procedural areas, and second, a rule providing what law would
apply if neither covered a subject was needed. The local rules were to
cover the "machinery of running" the court.68 A second draft stated
that any areas not covered by statute, the Federal Rules, or local rules
"shall be governed by the common law as developed and applied in the
federal courts."6 9 The committee debated the choice between that lan-
guage, and/or the use of state or equity practice to cover the residue.
Clark feared that reference to state law in the residuary provision
6 Suggestions of Local Committees and Suggestions of District Judges, as com-
piled by the Secretary of the Advisory Committee and furnished to members to accom-
pany Tentative Draft (Oct. 15-16, 1935), contained in looseleaf binder entitled Advi-
sory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Tentative Draft 1 (Oct. 15-16, 1935)
[hereinafter T.D. I] in Harvard Law School Library. This binder and other original
documents pertaining to the work of the advisory committee were donated to Harvard
by Committee member Edmund M. Morgan, and are referred to collectively as Mor-
gan Papers hereinafter. For other sources of original papers relating to the Federal
Rules, see Burbank, supra note 1, at 1132 n.529.
67 T.D. I, supra note 66 (Note to Rule 3).
68 6 PROCEEDINGS OF MEETING OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR
CIVIL PROCEDURE 1515 (Feb. 20-25, 1936) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS ON RULES]
(Lemann, quoting Donworth); see also id. at 1514 (Edmund Morgan) ("The mechan-
ics, as they call it."). Members of the advisory committee also used this term to cover
matters that had not been reached by the Conformity Act, or by federal statutes. For-
mer Justice Olney of the California Supreme Court thought that "[a] good deal must
be left to the local court, in the way of regulating its own procedure." Id. at 1516-17.
69 Tentative Draft II (Dec. 26, 1935) [hereinafter T.D. II], in Morgan Papers,
supra note 66 (Rule A38) (binder).
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might lead to a rebirth of Conformity Act thinking. The committee
voted to delete the "common law as developed and applied in the fed-
eral courts" residuary clause.7
In a revised draft of February, 1937, Clark tried to solve both the
local rules and residuary clause issues by adopting the suggestion of a
Massachusetts committee to place residual power in each federal dis-
trict court,"' as was the case under the admiralty rules. Clark's draft
read: "In all cases not provided for by such rules, the district courts
may regulate their practice in such manner as they deem most expedi-
ent for the due administration of justice but not in any manner incon-
sistent with these rules." 2 In April, the Style Committee changed the
language slightly to the phraseology ultimately adopted in the last line
of Rule 83: "In all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts
may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these
rules."
7 3
Thus, Clark and the Advisory Committee ended up with a fairly
broad local rule provision in terms of coverage and the residue. 4 More-
over, Clark's initial controls on local rule power were eliminated.
Clark's first draft stated:
Each district court, by action of a majority of the judges
thereof, may establish further rules of practice and procedure
governing civil actions in its district, supplementary to these
rules, for the purpose of effectuating a simple and efficient
70 See PROCEEDINGS ON RULES, supra note 68, at 1508-18 (voting on lines 8-11
of Rule A38, Statutes and Former Rules of Practice to Apply When); see also T.D. II,
supra note 69, at 2 (Note on Rule A38) (Clark pleading for his residuary clause:
"Now that we are rid of the Conformity Act, let us stay rid of it.").
71 See Preliminary Draft 3 (Feb. 1937) [hereinafter P.D. 3], in Morgan Papers,
supra note 66 (Rule 92, Rules by District Courts) (binder). For copy of portion of
letter from the Massachusetts Committee, see T.D. I, supra note 66 (suggestions of
local committees on Rule 3).
72 P.D. 3, supra note 71 (Rule 92).
Style Committee Draft (Apr. 1937), in Morgan Papers, supra note 66 (Rule
92) (binder).
"' This is not even a true residuary clause, because there is no mandatory back-
stop in the absence of other law. All that Rule 83 stated was that the district courts had
the authority to decide in the interstices left by noncoverage. I presume that individual
district court judicial discretion, exercised either on a case-by-case basis or through
standing orders, is the ultimate residuary under this scheme, for no other is provided.
Apparently, though, the advisory committee did not anticipate the large number of
standing orders issued by individual federal judges that now exist. It was evidently
assumed that a single judge could not make her own local rule when there was more
than one judge in a district. One committee member (Lemann) pointed out that "[y]ou
would always want a majority of the district judges, where there was more than one
district judge. That ought not to be bracketed." (Brackets were used to show alternative
drafts to present to the Supreme Court.) Clark replied, "All right." PROCEEDINGS ON
RULES, supra note 68, at 1504.
[Vol. 137:1999
19891 FEDERAL RULES, LOCAL RULES, AND STATE RULES
procedure, provided, however, that such rules must be ap-
proved before becoming effective by the Supreme Court of
the United States, upon recommendation of its Advisory
Committee on Civil Procedure . . .
His note made clear that "all discussion in support of the rulemaking
power recognizes continuing supervision of the rules as essential.
176
Clark's second draft offered three alternative rules for controlling
the local rulemaking power: first, the "majority of the circuit judges for
the circuit" would be required to concur with a district court's local
rulemaking; or second, a majority of judges in a district could act on
their own; or third, the Supreme Court - and here there were two
sub-versions - would have to "approve" or "may amend or abrogate"
local rules.7
Committee deliberations revealed political problems. Under the
Equity Rules of 1912, the circuit courts had supervisory power over
district court rulemaking; the committee did not want to engage in a
battle between circuit and district court judges.78 Former Senator Pep-
per of the committee quipped: "We do not want to get our fingers in
the crack of the judicial door."'7 9 Committee members were also con-
cerned that by suggesting the need for a supervisory body they would
be perceived as trying to perpetuate their own power.80 They decided to
give the Supreme Court alternative proposals concerning authority over
local rules.8" Although Clark preferred to vest this power in the Su-
preme Court with the advice of an advisory committee, the committee
rejected that proposal.8 2 Later drafts gave only two alternatives: by the
action of a majority of a district's judges or, the same majority "with
the concurrence of a majority of the circuit judges for the circuit."83
The final version of Rule 83 provided that a majority of the judges
in each district could make local rules for their court so long as those
rules were not inconsistent with other law. There was no provision for
a supervisory body. Just as the "near as may be" language in the Con-
71 T.D. I, supra note 66 (Rule 3) (bracketed matter omitted).
71 Id. (note to Rule 3).
7 T.D. II, supra note 69 (Rule A37).
78 See PROCEEDINGS ON RULES, supra note 68, at 1495-97, 1502-04.
79 Id. at 1503.
80 See id. at 1498-1508.
81 See id.
82 For Clark's probable preference, see T.D. II, supra note 69 (Note to Rule
A37); PROCEEDINGS ON RULES, supra note 68, at 1498-1500 (Clark speaking for a
permanent advisory committee and for giving the Supreme Court control over local
rules).
83 Tentative Draft III (Mar. 1936), in Morgan Papers, supra note 66 (Rule A43)
(binder).
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formity Act had previously resulted in federal courts not following state
procedure, Rule 83 might be expected to result in material
nonuniformity among district courts under the emerging new scheme.
B. The Knox Committee Report: 1940
No sooner had the Federal Rules become effective in September,
1938, then the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges appointed
a committee of district court judges "to examine the various rules of the
District Courts and to make recommendations so that the greatest prac-
ticable degree of uniformity throughout the country should be se-
cured." '84 The Committee became known as the Knox Committee, after
its chairman, District Judge John C. Knox of the Southern District of
New York. The Conference's instructions to the Committee stressed
simplicity: "In the amendment of the rules of the respective District
Courts it is important that regard should be had to simplicity. It is the
sense of the Conference that these rules should be made in the spirit
which has governed the adoption of the new procedure; the rules should
be few, simple, and free from unnecessary technicalities.""5
Although the 1940 Knox Committee Report does not quantify the
number of local rules then existing, there were clearly enough to con-
cern the conference and the committee about impairment of uniformity.
To combat what we now call "local rule proliferation," they argued
that "very few local rules are now really indispensable" and that
"[u]nless experience demonstrates a pressing need for additional local
rules, none should be promulgated." 8
The charge to the committee had noted that the Federal Rules
required changes in the district court rules.87 But the committee found
that many local rules that pre-dated the Federal Rule and were in con-
flict had been retained."' Even worse, analysis of rules adopted in 32
districts since September 16, 1938 showed that:
[A] few of the new local rules have unnecessarily repeated
provisions of the Federal rules or attempted to restate the
effect of those provisions in different language. Others cover
ground upon which the Federal rules are intended to be
complete. Others attempt to lay down rigid details to imple-
S REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON LOCAL Dis-
TRICT COURT RULES III (1940) [hereinafter KNOX COMMITTEE REPORT].
8" Id. at 1 n.1.
86 Id. at 2-3.
" See id. at 1, n.1.
88 See id. at 10.
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ment or supplement the Federal rules in minor particulars
which had been deliberately left unregulated because of the
belief that the method of dealing with them could be best
determined in individual cases as the problems arise. Some
apparently overlook specific contrary provisions of the Fed-
eral rules. Rules such as these, which create inconsistencies
in practice among the various districts and leave doubt and
uncertainty in the minds of the bench and bar, are likely to
prove to be serious impediments to national uniformity.
They tend to defeat the simple general system of procedure
which the Federal rules were intended to establish for all
district courts.8 9
At the same time, the Report acknowledged that some local rules
were appropriate. Its first major conclusion was that varying local con-
ditions made "absolute uniformity in the local rules of the district
courts . . . impracticable and inadvisable." 90 Local policies were par-
ticularly relevant to rules on admission of attorneys to practice, calen-
daring of motions, and assignment of cases for trial.91
The Report noted differences among urban and rural districts that
might necessitate different rules, suggesting that some urban courts,
"feel that they must protect themselves from inexperienced, incompe-
tent, and unfit practitioners." 2 The number of judges and size of terri-
tory covered by districts influenced calendar and assignment issues.93
The Knox Committee further noted that the Federal Rules themselves
had specifically left five areas to "supplemental regulation by local
rule." '94 In a footnote quoting the Advisory Committee, the Report also
predicted that local rules would prove helpful in suggesting future
amendments to the Federal Rules-an early recognition of the experi-
mentation value in permitting local rules.9" The Report mentioned sev-
89 Id. at 11.
90 Id. at 2.
91 See id. at 7-9.
92 Id. at 8.
93 See id.
"' Id. at 9 n.4 ("They are: (1) pre-trial calendars (Rule 16), (2) trial calendars
(Rules 40 and 79(c)), (3) administration of estates by receivers (Rule 66), (4) motion
days and submission of motions on brief (Rule 78), and (5) court stenographers (Rule
80).").
"' See id. at 13 n.5 (citing 59 DEP'T J. BULL. OF DECISIONS ON FRCP 1-4 (Jan.
17, 1940)). For current discussions of the experimentation value of local rules, see
Flanders, Local Rules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation, or Infor-
mation?, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 213, 269-70 (1981) [hereinafter Flanders, Local Rules];
Flanders, In Praise of Local Rules, 62 JUDICATURE 28, 31 (1978) [hereinafter Flan-
ders, In Praise].
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eral subjects of local rules it thought inappropriate.96
More importantly, notwithstanding protestations that some courts
needed no local rules, the Knox Report contained a twenty-five page
appendix entitled "Suggested Local Rules for United States District
Courts." It provided rules on nine different topics, with twenty-eight
subtopics. Model rules were provided for bar admission, bar discipline,
and for several phases of litigation. However, the committee members
acknowledged that some districts might need more or fewer rules, and
if any court should find "the provision proposed is not suited to the
particular situation in that district, the necessary departures from the
proposed form should be freely made."97
C. Fifty Years Later
The Knox Report appeared in 1940, at the height of the euphoric
notions that under the new uniform Federal Rules, any lawyer could
go to any federal court, and be secure that she could understand and
master the procedure required, since that procedure would be at once
uniform and simple.98 Developments since have not borne out those
hopes. The reasons for local rule proliferation have probably multi-
plied. The number of cases in the federal courts has risen dramatically,
and cases may have become far more complex than the drafters of the
Federal Rules anticipated.99 Discovery and documentation is often
vast.' Many federal judges feel compelled to manage their dockets and
to routinize operations; some feel a need to control the behavior of the
large numbers of new lawyers who join the bar each year.10' Court.
9 These include selection of jurors, details of courtroom conduct, verification of
pleadings, and details of internal court administration. It also noted some districts had
rules on bankruptcy and stenographers, but these were deferred for future study. See
KNOX COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 84, at 16-20.
97 Id. at 14-15.
98 See, e.g., FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTI-
TUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C. AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY 28
(1939) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS].
11 See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS app. B, table B-2 at 350-52
(1985) (showing civil case filings in federal district courts rose from 33,591 in 1938 to
96,056 in 1973 and 241,159 in 1983); Burger, Annual Report on the State of the
Judiciary-1980, 66 A.B.A. J. 295, 297 (1980); Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Ju-
dicial Perspective, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 264, 275 (1979).
100 See, e.g., Sherman & Kinnard, Federal Court Discovery in the 80's-Making
the Rules Work, 95 F.R.D. 245, 246 nn.1-2 (1982) (reporting complaints about
overuse of discovery).
' See, e.g., Burger, supra note 99, at 295-96 (noting changes in judicial admin-
istration to deal with increased case loads, and commenting on the need for increased
emphasis on professional ethics in legal education); Costantino,Judges as Case Manag-
ers, TRIAL, Mar. 1981, at 56 (proposing a methodology for efficient case management
by judges); Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI.
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personnel have increased: there are more judges, clerks, administrators,
and new federal judicial officers called magistrates.'0 2
Perhaps because there is no consensus, Congress and the Judicial
Conference repeatedly try to solve problems by leaving important ques-
tions to local rules. At least thirty-nine provisions of Titles 12, 18, 22,
26, 28, 42, 46, and 50 direct, authorize, or result in local rulemak-
ing.103 During the past twenty years, the Judicial Conference has made
resolutions or recommendations directing or suggesting local rulemak-
ing on at least forty occasions."" Federal Judicial Center publications,
Judicial Council recommendations, and the Office of Audit and Review
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts have all, on
occasion, suggested local rules to all or selected federal trial courts.0 5
In 1983, the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee ex-
amined the proliferation of local rules.' 8 A 1985 Judiciary Committee
report noted the benefits of local rules (accommodating local conditions,
communicating required practices to the bar, and ridding the court of
routine tasks), but also identified several problems concerning local
rules, such as their promulgation without sufficient input, the tremen-
dous numbers of such rules, and the frequent conflict between local
L. REv. 306 (1986) (discussing the meaning and functions of managerial judging and
assessing its effectiveness); Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New
Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770 (1981)
(discussing pre-trial case management by judges); Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (describing managerial judging and expressing. concerns
about the emergence of judicial case management); Richey, A Federal Trial Judge's
Reflections on the Preparation for and Trial of Civil Cases, 52 IND. L.J. 111, 117-24
(1976) (setting forth Judge Richey's standard pre-trial order); Schwarzer, Managing
Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge's Role, 61 JUDICATURE 401 (1978) (discussing pre-
trial case management by judges).
102 See R. POSNER, supra note 99, at 97; Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited:
The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2131-32 (1989).
103 See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LOCAL RULES PROJECT, app. C-1 (Tent. Draft
Nov. 1987). For additional information on the Local Rules Project, see infra notes
108-16 and accompanying text.
104 See 1987 LOCAL RULES REPORT Appendices, supra note 103, app. C-2.
105 See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LOCAL RULES PROJECT, PRELIMINARY PROJECT
REPORT, apps. D-3, D-4, D-5 (Jan. 9, 1987).
106 See Rules Enabling Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Lib-
erties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. app. 3, at 333-436 (1984) (reprinting the following articles on
the subject of local rules: Note, Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 1251 (1967); Flanders, Local Rules, supra note 95; Flanders, In Praise, supra
note 95). The examination was in conjunction with looking into judiciary rulemaking
generally.
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rules and the Federal Rules."0 7 In the same year, under the auspices of
the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States
Judicial Conference, the committee's reporter, Dean Daniel R. Coquil-
lette of the Boston College Law School, commenced a massive study of
the local rules of ,the ninety-four federal district courts, starting first
with the civil rules.' 08
In July, 1988, the Local Rules Project (the Project) presented its
report on local civil rules to the committee. 0' Its major themes are
clear."0 The proliferation of local rules exists.
The ninety-four district courts currently have an aggregate
of approximately 5,000 local rules, not including many "sub-
rules," standing orders and standard operating procedures.
These rules are extraordinarily diverse and their numbers
continue to grow rapidly. To give one stark example, the
Central District of California, based in Los Angeles, has
about thirty-one local rules with 434 "sub-rules," supple-
mented by approximately 275 standing orders. At the other
extreme, the Middle District of Georgia has only one local
rule and just one standing order. These local rules literally
cover the entire spectrum of federal practice, from attorney
admission and discipline, through the various stages of trial,
including pleading and filing requirements, pre-trial discov-
ery procedures, and taxation of costs."'
107 See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RULES ENABLING A(7r OF 1985,
H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1985).
108 See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LOCAL RULES PROJECT, pt. I, at 1, 4 (Tent. Draft
Dec. 31, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 LOCAL RULES PROJECT]. The Project Director of the
Local Rules Project has been Mary P. Squiers, Esq. The consultant to the reporter on
the Project has been the author of this paper, Stephen N. Subrin. See id. The district
courts mailed their local rules to the Local Rules Project during the period from
Spring, 1986 through Fall, 1987; the Project's data were based on the local rules that
were received during that period. See id. at 4-5.
09 See Letter from Daniel R. Coquillette, Reporter, to Members of the Commit-
tee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (June 30, 1988), reprinted in 1988 LOCAL
RULES PROJECT, supra note 108 (introducing the Report of the Local Rules Project).
1"0 The Report was not final as of January 1, 1989, when this article was revised.
The major themes and conclusions of the Report did not change.
"1 1988 LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 108, pt. I, at 1. The Local Rules
Project materials that have been sent to each district court, the renumbering of local
rules at the request of the Judicial Conference, see infra note 112, and renewed interest
in local rules as a result of the recently passed Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act, see supra note 63, may well lead to the elimination of a substantial num-
ber of local rules. Under the Judicial Improvements Act, "[e]ach judicial council shall
periodically review . .. [local rules] for consistency with .. . [Federal Rules]. Each
council may modify or abrogate any such rule found inconsistent in the course of such a
review." Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102
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Moreover, the numbering systems of the local rules are extraordi-
narily diverse, making it difficult to find all of the local rules through-
out the country on any one topic.112
In order to examine the rules of the various districts in an orderly
fashion, and to facilitate a uniform numbering system, the Project di-
vided up the local rules into approximately 103 different topics, and
placed them under the various major topics found in the table of con-
tents of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such as "III. Pleadings
and Motions," "IV. Parties," and "V. Depositions and Discovery."'1 3
In analyzing 5,032 local provisions that fit within the 103 different top-
ics, the Project found 809 instances of possible repetition with other
federal rules or federal law, and 837 instances of possible inconsistency
with such law. The Project found 2,288 provisions where local varia-
tion was appropriate, and 768 provisions for which model rules could
be drafted to accommodate the apparent purposes of those local
rules.
114
The number of local rules provisions that fell within the 103 top-
ics varied not only among the federal courts throughout the country,
but also among the federal courts within a single state." 5 For example,
the Northern District of Texas had sixty-five provisions within the top-
ics, while the Western District had twenty-nine. The Eastern District
of Virginia had sixty, yet the Western District had seven.1
6
It is instructive to look briefly at one specific subset of local rules.
I have chosen discovery because the discovery provisions have turned
out to be central to the Federal Rules enterprise, and because the Rules
Stat. 4642, 4651 (1988).
112 See 1988 LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 108, pt. V, at 1. The Judicial
Conference has approved, and urged each district court to adopt, a uniform numbering
system. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 103 (Sept.
1988).
111 See 1988 LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 108, pt. I, at 4-5 & app. A.
114 There were 330 provisions relating to issues that the Local Rules Project sug-
gested should be considered by the advisory committee. These totals were provided to
the author by Mary P. Squiers, the Local Rules Project director.
1"5 This is a different figure from the number of local rules authorized by a dis-
trict court. One rule often covered more than one of the Project's topics, and some rules
did not fall within any of the topics.
"I See 1988 LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 108, pt. VIII. This section of
the 1988 Local Rules Project provides for each of the ninety-four federal district courts:
the number of the local rule analyzed (using the district's own numbering system), the
conclusion of the Project as to each rule (should remain subject to local variation;
should consider a model local rule on the subject; should be considered by the advisory
committee for inclusion in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), possible repetition
with other federal law, including the Federal Rules, possible inconsistency with other
federal law, including the Federal Rules, and a citation to the portion of the 1988
Local Rules Project where the specific topic is discussed and analyzed.
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have accounted for both the most fees and the most controversy."' Dis-
covery rules are also informative with respect to evolving new assump-
tions concerning American civil procedure.
There are two distinct spirits within the Federal Rules, one old,
the other new. Both are exemplified by the discovery rules. The old
spirit is expansive and gives broad latitude to lawyers. The liberal dis-
covery provisions were a logical companion to the liberal pleading
rules. Permissive discovery would inform the parties of the relevant
facts, eliminate surprise, help limit the issues, and provide a basis for
either intelligent settlement or an efficient trial."' Broad discovery
would also facilitate summary judgment." 9 The apex of this spirit of
extensive attorney latitude was reached in 1970, when the Federal Rule
34 requirement of a motion showing "good cause" for the production of
documents and other items was eliminated. 20 According to the advisory
committee notes, this was done in order "to have the rule operate
" See, e.g., Discovery, LITIGATION, Fall 1988, at 7 ("[D]iscovery dominates.
The journey from complaint to resolution is a slow trek across the badlands of discov-
ery. The dominance of civil discovery has changed what it means to be a litigator.
There are 'litigation associates' who only do document review and interrogatory draft-
ing. Some firms encourage lawyers to specialize, and to spend their entire professional
lives only taking depositions. The day is fast approaching-if it is not already
here-when litigators will not try cases; they will just discover each other to death.
Discovery affects how the public, and clients, see trial lawyers. Few aspects of litigation
are more criticized than foot-thick interrogatories and endless depositions. And who can
doubt that discovery is a main cause of the escalating cost of lawsuits? The bill for a
case not ended quickly will mostly cover discovery."); supra note 100 and accompany-
ing text; see also, Taylor, Judges Identify Causes of Delay in Civil Litigation, LITIGA-
TION NEWS, Dec. 1988, at 3 ("Abuse of the discovery process was identified more often
than any other factor as a major cause of delay in civil litigation by both the state and
federal judges polled. Approximately 80% of all of the judges polled said they have had
at least some problems with the discovery process. In addition, the overwhelming ma-
jority of the 161 federal judges [of 200 interviewed] and 503 state judges [of the 800
interviewed] who said that litigation costs are excessive identified discovery practices as
the cause.").
"18 See, e.g., Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules,
15 TENN. L. REV. 737, 738-39 (1939) [hereinafter Sunderland, Discovery Under the
Federal Rules] (noting the merits of liberal discovery rules); Sunderland, Theory and
Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 21 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 125, 126-27 (1937)
(discussing the increased efficiency that accompanies pre-trial discovery); Sunderland,
Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 864-65, 869 (1933)
[hereinafter Sunderland, Scope and Method] (discussing the limitations of pleadings
and the need for discovery to promote efficient resolution of disputes). Edson Sunder-
land was the member of the initial Federal Rules advisory committee who wrote the
initial draft of the discovery provisions.
119 See, e.g., Sunderland, Discovery Under the Federal Rules, supra note 118, at
755-57; Sunderland, Scope and Method, supra note 118, at 872-73 (providing statistics
which demonstrated an increase in summary judgments when discovery rules were
liberalized).
120 See FED. R. Civ. P. 34 & advisory committee note (1970 amendments).
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extrajudicially." 12'
The amendments of the 1980s brought a second spirit, one of dis-
covery curtailment on a case-by-case basis. The 1980 discovery confer-
ence amendment (Rule 26 (0), the 1983 Rule 7 and 11 signature re-
quirements and sanction provisions, the Rule 26(b)(1) amendment
permitting discovery limitation by the court on a case-by-case basis,
Rule 26(g) certification and sanction provisions, and Rule 16 additions
to the purposes of pre-trial conferences all pointed in the new direction:
the court should aggressively control discovery as well as other proce-
dural incidents on a case-by-case basis.122
The Project found approximately 412 local rules provisions deal-
ing with discovery. They divided them into a total of twenty-three sepa-
rate topics. These included eighteen topics in which the local rules were
either repetitive or inconsistent with other federal law, three topics for
which the Project thought that either model local rules or local varia-
tion was appropriate, and two other topics to be considered by the advi-
sory committee.
The Project found significant differences among the courts with
respect to local discovery rules. For example, the Southern District of
California had approximately sixteen provisions within the twenty-
three discovery topics while the Central District had eight, the North-
ern District, six, and the Eastern District, five. In New York, the East-
ern District had approximately twelve discovery provisions that fell
within the Project's discovery topics, the Southern District had eight,
the Northern District, four, and the Western District, only one. The
District Courts for Wyoming and Alaska each had approximately ten
discovery provisions falling within the Project's discovery topics, while
the Southern District of Iowa had about five and the Western District
of Wisconsin, one.12
The local discovery rules indicate that many federal judges think
that neither attorney latitude nor case-by-case curtailment works well.
Leaving the amount of discovery to each individual lawyer acting on
121 FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee note (1970 amendments).
122 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a) advisory committee note (1983 amendments)
("The amended rule makes scheduling and case management an express goal of pre-
trial procedure."); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee note (1983 amendments)
("The new sentence is intended to encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying
and discouraging discovery overuse."); see also, Shapiro, supra note 10, at 1983-87
(discussing the trend toward increased judicial case management embodied in the 1983
amendment of Rule 16); Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67
A.B.A. J. 1648-51 (1981) (discussing the increased role of the judiciary in monitoring
discovery on an ad-hoc basis under the 1983 amendments to Rule 26). Local rules have
rejected this case-by-case basis. See infra text accompanying notes 124-31.
12 See 1988 LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 108, pt. VIII.
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her own or using later motions to reduce the amount of discovery or
applying sanctions on abuses has not solved the problem. Moreover, the
local rules also suggest that the sheer bulk of discovery documentation
has become a burden to the courts: sixty-four district courts have local
rules which provide that discovery material need not be filed, although
such a non-filing proposal was defeated at the advisory committee in
1980, and Federal Rule 5(d) makes filing the norm.124
Fifty-two federal district courts have local rules which require a
conference between the parties prior to their bringing any discovery
motion. Some of these districts have detailed provisions mandating what
must be discussed and recorded. These provisions thus reject the pure
adversarial view of discovery. Many federal judges apparently are un-
willing to waste time on discovery matters that can reasonably be set-
tled without judicial intervention.' 25 Thirty-three district courts have
local rules that outline the form required for discovery motions and
accompanying memoranda. This indicates that the judges are seeking a
more routinized system to facilitate deciding discovery motions, and
perhaps even to discourage them.1
2 6
Most important, though, are the ways in which federal local rules
explicitly limit discovery in advance (although provision is made for
additional discovery upon motion). Fifty-four of the ninety-four federal
district courts have local rules that limit the number of interrogatories
that can be served by each party. These limits range from twenty to
fifty interrogatories, with thirty being the most common. All of the lim-
itations "specifically allow the propounding party to serve more inter-
rogatories with leave of court."' 27 These rules place the burden of prov-
ing the necessity of exceeding the limit on the party seeking additional
discovery. This contrasts sharply with Federal Rule 26(c), which re-
124 See 1988 LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 108, pt. II, at 91-92; Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States,.Prelimi-
nary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 77
F.R.D. 613, 622-23 (1978) (proposing an amendment to Rule 5(d) to eliminate the
filing requirement for discovery materials that are not used in court proceedings); see
also 4A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1142,
1152 (2d ed. 1982) (describing the amendment to Rule 5(d) adopted in 1980 which
retained the filing requirement subject to court discretion); FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d) &
advisory committee note (1980 amendments)(same).
12 See 1988 LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 108, pt. III, at 77-81.
126 See id. at 75-77.
127 Id., pt. II, at 97-101. For history of the advisory committee's rejection of
numeric limits on interrogatories, see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 33 advisory committee note
(1946 amendments) (discussing amendment that eliminated original limitation on the
number of interrogatories); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 124, § 2168, at
519-20 (1970) (discussing elimination of numerical limits under 1948 amendment); id.
at 222 & nn.55.5-.7 (Supp. 1988) (discussing rejection of 1978 proposal to limit to 30
the number of interrogatories that could be served by a party).
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quires the party or person who desires to limit discovery to make the
motion.' 28
One federal district court has a local rule requiring that each dep-
osition be limited to six hours; another limits the number of depositions
to five. 29 One court has a rule limiting the number of requests for
production of documents to thirty; twelve federal district courts limit
each of the parties to anywhere from ten to forty requests for admis-
sion.'30 There are several other local rules which impose limitations on
the time, place, or form of discovery. 1
The point is not that these local rules are probably inconsistent
with the Federal Rules, although this is often true.132 Rather, taken as
a group, these local discovery rules suggest that a third procedural
spirit has evolved: a spirit of absolute curtailment in the absence of
proof that persuades a judge that the party seeking more discovery is
entitled to it.
The local discovery rules also hint that a fourth spirit is emerging:
the fashioning, in advance, of some procedures for particular types of
cases. Six federal district courts have local rules which limit initial dis-
covery in class actions to facts pertaining to class certification. 3 Two
courts permit pro se civil rights complainants to engage in Federal
Rules discovery "if, and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of
his discretion and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not
otherwise."34 This is not discovery with extensive attorney latitude.
128 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
129 See 1988 LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 108, pt. II, at 111.
130 See id. at 112, 116.
131 See id. at 97 (thirteen jurisdictions require court approval of stipulations, in-
eluding those involving discovery matters); id. at 101 (four jurisdictions require that a
deposition to be offered in evidence be abstracted or purged of extraneous and irrele-
vant .discussion between the attorneys); id. at 102 (eight jurisdictions define "reasonable
notice" as used in FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)); id. at 104 (five jurisdictions require that
videotaped depositions be transcribed by a reporter simultaneously). There are similar
restrictions, also conflicting with the Federal Rules, with respect to depositions for use
in foreign proceedings, see id. at 105-06, opening and sealing depositions, see id. at
106-08, telephone depositions, see id. at 110, stipulating the time and place of deposi-
tions, see id. at 111, and physical and mental examinations of persons, see id. at 117-
18.
132 In the 1988 Local Rules Project, local rules dealing with requirements of fil-
ing, stipulations, interrogatories, use of depositions in court, definition of "reasonable
notice," video depositions, depositions for use in foreign proceedings, opening and seal-
ing of depositions, providing the deposition officer with rules, telephone depositions,
stipulating the time and place of depositions, limitations on depositions, requests for
production of documents, physical and mental examinations, and requests for admis-
sions, are found to be inconsistent with the Federal Rules or other federal law. See
1988 LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 108, pt. II.
1 See id. at 67-68.
1 Id. at 81.
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Nor is it case-by-case or across-the-board curtailment. Rather, it may
be the beginning of a spirit that in a non-trans-substantive manner
selects out classes of cases in advance for different discovery treatment
from other cases. There are similar non-trans-substantive local rules for
other types of cases dealing with topics as diverse as social security,
three-judge district courts, black lung, deportation and exclusion, natu-
ralization, and, most frequently, bankruptcy and admiralty."3 5
We may think of this as a spirit of procedural-substantive law
integration which seeks in advance to tailor some procedural rules to
the unique needs of a particular type of lawsuit. While this approach
may have some benefits, it is, of course, the antithesis of trans-substan-
tive uniformity. Moreover, to the extent that this approach is realized
by local rules which state courts and other federal district courts do not
copy, it reduces intrastate and interdistrict court procedural uniformity.
III. STATE MODELING: WHO'S FOLLOWING WHOM?
A. Divergence and Uniformity
Under the Conformity Act, intrastate procedural uniformity was
to result from federal judges conforming federal practice to state prac-
tice. Depending on whether one looks through the eyes of a Shelton or
a Walsh, the conformity was erratic or substantial, and the disruption
to lawyers from non-conformity was material or insignificant.' 36 To
those who advocated federal rules, intrastate uniformity was to result
from the modeling by state supreme courts of state procedure on fed-
eral. The federal rules were to be an enlightened magnet.' Again,
depending on one's point of view, the modeling was substantial or
insubstantial.
In 1940, Arizona became the first state to change its civil proce-
dure to follow the federal model.' 8' Norman Hull, at the time a Phoe-
35 See id. at 34-37 (social security cases); id. at 37-40 (three judge district
courts); id. at 49-51 (black lung cases); id. at 86-88 (deportation and exclusion cases);
id. at 170-71 (naturalization); id., § 3 (Suggested Local Rules), at 45-48 (social secur-
ity cases); id. at 48-52 (three judge district courts); id. at 128-29 (naturalization peti-
tions). Most, if not all, jurisdictions have local rules specifically addressing bankruptcy,
and approximately 30 have local rules for admiralty cases. The Knox Committee Re-
port thought it was "clear and logical" to have separate sets of local rules adopted to
civil, admiralty, bankruptcy, and criminal cases. See KNOX COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 84, at 20. Of course, the Federal Rules also have some non-trans-substan-
tive provisions, such as Rules 9(b), 9(h), 14(c), 23, 23.1, and 71A.
Mb See supra text accompanying notes 16-21 & 43-45.
137 See supra text accompanying note 39.
13 See Oakley & Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State
Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1381 (1986).
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nix lawyer, argued in favor of Arizona's adoption of the Federal Rules.
Hull believed that adoption of the Federal Rules was advisable for
three reasons. First, the United States Supreme Court had examined
the Rules at length and believed them to be highly desirable. Second,
they were the product of thousands of lawyers, and Arizona was un-
likely to improve upon them. Third, "lawyers practicing before the
state courts would be governed by the same rules and, when practicing
before any federal court in the United States they could walk into the
courtroom and feel at home."' 39
The extent to which the Supreme Court actually had studied the
Rules before their adoption was a matter of dispute between Charles E.
Clark, who argued that the Supreme Court played an important role,
and his more skeptical colleague, James William Moore. 4 ° Although
many lawyers and judges did offer suggestions to the advisory commit-
tee, the final product primarily reflected the views of Clark and Edson
Sunderland, a University of Michigan Law School professor."4 '
Nonetheless, Hull's reasons were similar to the arguments of mod-
eling proponents both before and after the Enabling Act was passed.
42
John Frank, a member of the symposium panel, was at Yale Law
School as a student and a faculty member before becoming a lawyer in
Arizona. 43 He was one of several lawyers and law professors, many of
whom had studied or taught at prestigious Eastern law schools, who
enthusiastically embraced the Federal Rules.'4 4 Frank explained in
19 Allen, The New Rules in Arizona, 16 F.R.D. 183, 184 (1954).
140 Compare J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 0.511-0.512 (1st ed. 1959) (not-
ing the Supreme Court can only devote a minimal amount of time and energy to rule-
making) with Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938-1958: Two Decades
of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 435, 441-42 (1958) (discussing the
active supervisory role played by the Supreme Court) and Clark, The Role of the Su-
preme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 250, 251-52
(1963) (same).
141 See Subrin, supra note 1, at 961-73 (on Clark); id. at 967 (on Sunderland).
Correspondence to the advisory committee shows that Clark was responsible for draft-
ing the majority of the provisions, while others were initially drafted by Sunderland.
See Letter from Edgar B. Tolman to the United States Supreme Court Advisory Com-
mittee On Rules For Civil Procedure (Oct. 18, 1935).
142 For one of the modeling arguments before the Enabling Act was passed, see
supra note 39 and accompanying text.
143 See WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA 1028 (45th ed. 1988).
a Moore pointed out that "in numbers the East may have been overly repre-
sented." J. MOORE, supra note 140, at § 0.511. There was (and is) a certain inbred
quality of many of those most associated with the Federal Rules and modern American
civil procedure. James William Moore was an instructor of law at Yale in 1935, and
became a professor at Yale Law School in 1943. He was the original author of Moore's
Federal Practice. See WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA, supra note 143, at 1978 (44th ed.
1986). Fleming James, Jr. was a student at Yale, and later a law professor there. See
id. at 1583 (39th ed. 1976). Moore and James were assistants to Clark (then Dean at
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1967 why Arizona would rather be uniform than right: "We would
prefer to have not even a day in which the Arizona lawyer is practicing
under different systems in the two courts . . .,,""' Frank added to
Hull's reasons: Arizona lawyers and judges had become accustomed to
the Federal Rules and could rely on federal procedural precedents and
treatises, and the Rules were usually good ones. 4'
Within a decade, a few other Southwestern and Western states
with relatively small populations followed Arizona's lead. Colorado
(1941), New Mexico (1942), and Utah (1950) adopted the Federal
Rules, but during this initial period these four states stood alone.'
47
Nebraska, which like Arizona was an early code state without a large
population, might have been expected to follow, but Nebraska has
never adopted the Federal Rules.148 The debate there over modeling
took place during the 1940s and produced anti-uniformity arguments,
which, like the Arizona pro-modeling position, still make sense.
In 1942, H.W. Shackelford of the Nebraska Bar wrote one of the
few articles that clearly articulates the anti-modeling position.'49 Shack-
Yale Law School) during the drafting process. Sunderland was a research associate at
Yale Law School from 1931-1933, during Clark's deanship. See id. at 2684 (26th ed.
1950). Charles Alan Wright graduated from Yale Law School in 1949, and then be-
came Clark's law clerk when Clark was a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. See id. at 3371 (45th ed. 1988). Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. has been
a professor at Yale Law School since 1971. See id. at 1359. He and James have au-
thored a major treatise on Civil Procedure. See G. HAZARD & F. JAMES, CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE (3d ed. 1985). Alexander Holtzoff (later United States District Judge for the
District of Columbia) was a Special Assistant to Attorney General Homer Cummings
(who was instrumental in having the Enabling Act passed) and participated in the
drafting process, on assignment from the Attorney General's office. See WHO'S WHO IN
AMERICA, supra note 143, at 1067 (36th ed. 1970). Holtzoff was an initial author of J.
BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1951); Wright re-
vised the treatise, which later became Wright & Miller. Benjamin Kaplan, Albert
Sacks, and Arthur Miller were all professors at Harvard Law School who succeeded
Clark as reporters to the advisory committee. See WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA, supra
note 143, at 1626 (45th ed. 1988) (Kaplan); id. at 2696 (Sacks); id. at 2149 (Miller).
The current Reporter, Paul Carrington, is a graduate of Harvard Law School, where
he was also a teaching fellow. See id. at 497. Both Cummings and William DeWitt
Mitchell, the first chairman of the advisory committee, were students at Yale Sheffield
Scientific School, and Cummings received his law degree at Yale. See id. at 595 (29th
ed. 1956) (Cummings); id. at 1799 (Mitchell); see also, Subrin, supra note 1, at 971
n.369 ("In terms of education, type and size of law firm, clients, offices held in profes-
sional organizations, and membership in social clubs, the Advisory Committee mem-
bers, particularly the lawyers, appear to comprise an extremely elite group.").
14' Frank, Arizona and the Federal Rules, 41 F.R.D. 79, 85 (1967).
148 See id. at 87-88.
147 See Oakley & Coon, supra note 138, at 1428 app. The District of Columbia
also became a "replica state" in 1942. See id. For the meaning of "replica state," see
infra note 153 and accompanying text.
148 See Oakley & Coon, supra note 138, at 1407.
149 See Shackelford, Why Adopt New Rules of Pleading and Practice?, 21 NEB.
L. REV. 94 (1942).
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elford asserted that Nebraska's code procedure was one of the simplest
and most workable in the country, that the cost of operating under it
was not unduly burdensome, and that the Federal Rules were designed
for the larger, more complicated cases that make up federal practice.
"The more simple 'two-party' controversies that form the mill run of
cases brought in our state courts do not require elaborate and technical
rules of procedure, such as are embodied in the proposed rules."' 50 He
did not find that the Federal Rules simplified procedure, as the propo-
nents claimed, nor did he see a need to give the trial judge greater
control over litigation. He noted, with some humor, that although the
Federal Rules had been "extensively propagandized" by publishers of
law books, only four or five of the forty-eight states had adopted them;
it seemed too early to predict that they would be universally adopted . 5'
Shackelford was correct to question universal adoption. A 1982
article by Professor John Oakley of the University of California, and
his former student, Arthur Coon, provides a comprehensive survey of
state modeling.'5 2 They used a refined, nine variable test to determine
what they call a "replica" state.' 5 3 They report that in 1975 Massachu-
setts became the last of twenty-two states plus the District of Columbia
to conform its procedure substantially to the Federal Rules through ju-
dicially promulgated rules; if one includes statutorily adopted versions
of the Federal Rules, there are four additional states, making a total of
twenty-six.1
5
1
For the most part the replica states are those with the smallest
populations. Of the ten most populous states, only Ohio is a replica
state. 155 The other nine-California, New York, Texas, Pennsylvania,
Illinois, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, and North Carolina-have
not adopted the Federal Rules either judicially or legislatively.' 56 In
150 Id. at 99.
151 Id.
152 See Oakley & Coon, supra note 138.
153 Oakley & Coon, supra note 138, at 1372-75. Their nine criteria are: judicially
promulgated rules; conformity with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure organization
and numbering; merger of law and equity; conformity with federal joinder rules, as
amended in 1966; conformity with federal discovery rules, as amended in 1970; sum-
mary judgment modeled on the Federal Rules; adoption of "notice pleading"; if the
state rules are "idiosyncratic . . .by federal standards" they must still be consistent
with "the Federal Rules' philosophy of 'procedure as the handmaiden of justice' "; if
Federal Rules precedents and commentary are persuasive authority. Id. at 1374-75.
151 See id. at 1425, 1428 app. Oakley and Coon found that Georgia, Kansas,
Oklahoma, and North Carolina "operate under statutorily adopted versions of the Fed-
eral Rules." Id. at 1378.
155 See id. at 1429 app.
116 See id.
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contrast, eleven of the fifteen least populous states are replica states.'""
As of 1982, only 26% of the United States population was governed by
a procedural system that replicated the Federal Rules.' 5 8 Oakley and
Coon found that even "when a looser test than replication was applied
to classify states as generally following the model of the Federal Rules,
the resulting tally embraced a majority of states but a minority of our
national population.'7
159
On the other hand, of the non-replica states, eleven have notice
pleading-a hallmark of the Federal Rules.'" Seven of those, plus an-
other three states, have procedural systems very similar to the Federal
Rules, notwithstanding some important variations. 6 ' That makes
thirty-two states that are either replica states, or which by legislation or
court rule have adopted major portions of the Federal Rules. Even by
this method, though, eight of the ten most populous states would not be
counted as having adopted the Federal Rules.6 2
The major national promoters of state-modeling insisted that par-
tial adoption of the Federal Rules by a state was worse than non-adop-
tion.' By that test, there was substantial non-adoption. But a visitor to
this country from another legal system would probably conclude that
there was a good deal of intrastate and interstate uniformity. The most
important attributes of the Federal Rules-merger of law and equity,
ease of pleading and amendment, liberal joinder of parties and theories,
broad discovery, and summary judgment-would probably be part of
the rules of most civil litigation whether in a federal or state court.
6 4
117 See id.
158 See id. at 1425 n.394, 1428 app. (Oakley and Coon use a total population
figure of 226,549,000, and their replica states, including the District of Columbia, have
a population of 59,890,000).
159 Id. at 1369.
160 See id. at 1428 app.
181 See id. at 1377-78. These states are Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada, Georgia,
Kansas, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Arkansas, Delaware, and South Carolina.
18l See id. at 1377-78, 1429 app. The two states that would be included are Ohio
(replica state) and North Carolina (notice pleading/federal code procedural system). In
a separate article, a former student of mine, Steve Halpern, and I are exploring the
historical context of modeling on a state by state basis, and the phenomenon of large
state rejection of the Federal Rules.
18I See, e.g., Clark, The Texas and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20
TEX. L. REV. 4, 14 (1941) ("I have stated my view that piecemeal reform may often be
less desirable than no reform at all. For it may serve to upset the bench and bar by the
need of learning a new system which is little advance and thus prejudice the securing of
complete reform for many years."); Clark, Dissatisfaction with Piecemeal Reform, 24
J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 121, 121 (1940) (slight gain from piecemeal reform "is not
worth the cost of the confusion entailed, and . . . the more adequate reform is actually
delayed by the half-way steps").
18, See McKusick, State Courts' Interest in Federal Rulemaking: A Proposal for
Recognition, 36 ME. L. REV. 253, 253 (1984) ("Even those states such as Illinois,
[Vol. 137:1999
19891 FEDERAL RULES, LOCAL RULES, AND STATE RULES 2031
Uniformity, however, was advocated not primarily to promote a na-
tional procedural philosophy, but rather to permit the identical proce-
dural rules in both state and federal courts in order to make it easier to
practice in both. In large measure, this goal has not been met. 65
B. Emerging Patterns
The road to uniformity has never been a one-way street. Whether
in terms of specific procedural rules or broad procedural outlook, the
states have perhaps given as much as they have taken. Connor Hall
may prove to be partially correct: before the tale has ended, portions of
federal court procedure may evolve to a new conformity to state law.
Discovery again provides an interesting focal point. In 1932,
George Ragland's Discovery Before Trial documented a rich variety of
state pre-trial discovery techniques.1 "6 Sunderland, who drafted the
Federal Rule discovery provisions,16 7 acknowledges his debt to the prior
discovery experience in the states.16 8 Sunderland's approach was inclu-
sion, not exclusion. He took the types of discovery that were available
in some state trial courts, and made them available to all parties and in
all cases, subject to protective orders and sanctions.
1 6 9
Looking to patterns in discovery subsequent to the promulgation of
the Federal Rules, I stress the Massachusetts experience. This is only
because I know much more about it than about the developments in
other states.170 Our local rules, standing orders, and legal culture may
Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania that have not modeled their civil procedure
generally on the federal rules have nonetheless adopted comparable provisions to govern
certain matters as, for example, joinder of parties, class actions, or discovery. Thus, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have come to serve the same function that is served in
other fields of the law by the work product of the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws. The federal civil rules are de facto model rules for state
rulemakers." (footnotes omitted)); Weinstein, After Fifty Years of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901,
1901-02 (1989) (extolling the influence of the Federal Rules).
165 This non-uniformity is due not only to a failure of state adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules. Both federal local rules, see supra notes 98-135 and accompanying text, and
state local rules, see infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text, contribute to the non-
uniformity.
166 See G. RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 19-266 (1932). Federal local
rules also often look to state procedure. See Flanders, Local Rules, supra notd 95 at
234-235 (citing study showing voir dire practice in federal court often follows state
practice).
167 See supra note 118.
... See Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 21-22 (1938);
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 98, at 254.
169 See Sunderland, supra note 168, at 21-22.
170 I studied law in Massachusetts and practiced law there for almost eight years
(primarily as a trial lawyer in civil cases). Currently, I teach there and have been
Reporter to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Standing Advisory Committee
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well be unrepresentative; the problems we have addressed, however,
and some of our approaches are not.1"1
During the period that Arizona was adopting new procedure
based on the Federal Rules, the Massachusetts Legislature refused to
recognize the authority of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to
regulate practice and procedure. 72 Massachusetts ultimately arrived at
the Federal Rules through two steps. First, in 1966, after a lengthy
lobbying effort by Chief Justice G. Joseph Tauro of the Massachusetts
Superior Court and the bar associations, the Supreme Judicial Court
promulgated a rule for oral depositions and other types of discovery
patterned on the Federal Rules. Massachusetts was the forty-second
jurisdiction to authorize oral depositions."'
Tauro wrote:
I personally contacted many lawyers and judges from
jurisdictions having broad oral discovery rules and thor-
oughly discussed their actual experience with the rules. The
vast majority [said] oral discovery saves lawyers', litigants'
and courts' time and effort since it promotes more realistic
settlement negotiations, brings lawyers together at an early
stage thus facilitating early settlement negotiations and
makes shorter and more orderly trials possible. 74
In order to dispel the fears of the Massachusetts plaintiffs' bar, he re-
ported, based on the results of a questionnaire he mailed to plaintiffs'
lawyers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, that harassment through oral
depositions was not a significant problem.'
75
In 1968, the Massachusetts Judicial Council began a procedure
that ultimately resulted in the adoption of the bulk of the Federal Rules
on the Rules of Civil Procedure since 1982.
... For instance, the Massachusetts limitation of thirty interrogatories has become
the norm in federal courts, see supra note 127 and accompanying text, and tracking
was proposed for federal courts prior to its adoption in Massachusetts, see infra notes
204-07 and accompanying text.
172 See Grinnell, Regulation of Practice and Procedure in Massachusetts, MASS.
L.Q., Jan.-Apr. 1938, at 9, 10; The Rule-Making Bill, MASS. L.Q., Apr.-June 1939,
at 8, 8-15; Fifteenth Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, MASS. L.Q.,
Jan.-Mar. 1940, at 5, 10-11.
173 See Tauro, Oral Discovery-A Brief Recapitulation, 50 MASS. L.Q. 215, 224
(1965) [hereinafter Tauro, Oral Discovery]. Shortly thereafter the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court adopted Rule 15, introducing oral depositions to the Common-
wealth. See Tauro, Report to the Members of the Bar-IV, 51 MASS. L.Q. 345, 346
(1966); see also, Facher, Supreme Judicial Court Rule 15-Landmark in Massachu-
setts Procedure, 51 MASS. L.Q. 5, 5-50 (1966) (describing and discussing the opera-
tion, application, and effects of Rule 15).
174 Tauro, Oral Discovery, supra note 173, at 216.
175 See id. at 218-24.
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in 1974 (albeit with some variations to comport with Massachusetts
practice).
1 6
There had been an earlier attempt to have the Federal discovery
rules adopted for Massachusetts. I mention this episode because Massa-
chusetts too had a gentleman who had intense doubts about aspects of
the Federal Rules enterprise. George P. Dike was a Boston lawyer who
had been a litigator since 1903.77 For ten years he had tried cases in
federal court under the old equity rules, for twenty-five years under the
Equity Rules of 1912, and for thirteen years under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.178 In 1951, thirteen years after the Federal Rules
became law, Dike concluded that "[t]he preliminary proceedings have
grown until the whistle is bigger than the boiler.'
7 9
Dike explained what a great gain it had been when the federal
courts, as a result of the Equity Rules of 1912, gave up trial by written
deposition.
The other day I picked up an old record and found that tes-
timony by deposition was taken on forty-four days between
January 19, 1898 and April 28, 1900, a period of two years
and three months. I shudder when I recollect the total injus-
tice of the procedure. The expense was enormous and delays
terrific. 1
80
Dike was critical of the Federal Rules:
Now . . .we have this mongrel procedure which is neither
trial by deposition nor trial in open court. . . . [B]oth parties
file interrogatories and requests for admissions often running
to many pages and requiring an enormous amount of re-
search to answer. Next each side proceeds to examine in a
lawyer's office "any person" including opposing parties, of-
ficers and directors on any subject germane or not germane
to the case. This is a licensed fishing expedition-a weari-
some exasperating performance for reluctant witnesses and
for counsel alike. There is constant abuse of the privilege of
17' See A Symposium: The Massachusetts Rules of Civil and Appellate Proce-
dure, 59 MAss. L.Q. 113, 115-26 (1974); Project to Revise Massachusetts Rules of
Procedure Begins, 53 MAss. L.Q. 337, 337 (1968).
177 See Dike, Comments on the Federal Rules For Discovery: A Criticism of Trial
by Deposition, MASS. L.Q., Oct. 1951, at 15, 15-16 (speech delivered at the Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association, at a symposium on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure sponsored by the Section of Judicial Administration).
78 See id. at 15.
179 Id. at 16.
180 Id. at 17.
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discovery. The result may be hundreds or even thousands of
pages of transcript, often taken up with the wrangling of
counsel and containing'a minimum of information material
to the issues of the case. These depositions are even worse
than those taken under the original equity rules because
Rule 26(b) expressly sanctions examination as to wholly
inadmissible matters.' 81
Dike said that he had heard that the drafters of the Rules thought
that discovery abuse could be controlled by the courts, but he felt that
busy judges showed "an obvious distaste" for ruling on discovery mo-
tions, which could frequently be heard only after "considerable delay."
Consequently, lawyers were encouraged to engage in "some pretty wide
deviations from the line of proper interrogation."'" 2 The solutions, he
thought, might be to limit discovery to written interrogatories, unless
the court gave specific approval for depositions and limited in advance
the permissible "range of the examination."' 83
Our whole preliminary procedure must be simplified
and shortened.
But whatever the remedy we must not revert to trial by
deposition. We must not give up the great gain which was
made when we adopted the Equity Rules of 1912, and we
must eliminate the waste, delay and injustice of the present
procedure preliminary to trial.' 4
Both state and federal courts have tried to find ways to limit dis-
covery without resorting to ongoing day-by-day judicial case manage-
ment. Although Dike failed to prevent the adoption of the Federal dis-
covery provisions, Massachusetts did not totally replicate the federal
model, retaining the thirty interrogatory limit which had been previ-
ously mandated by statute.'8 5 Furthermore, in an instance of reverse
modeling, the Massachusetts Federal District Court has recently
adopted the state limitation by local rule. 8 6
An April 1988 editorial in the Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly
urges further movement in the direction of pre-defined limitations (the
's Id. at 18-19.
182 Id. at 19.
183 Id. at 21.
184 Id.
8' See MASS. R. Civ. P. 33. The thirty interrogatory limit originated from MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 61 (Law. Co-op. 1986)."I See D. MASS. LOCAL R. 16(a)(1).
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third spirit of federal procedure), and different rules for different cate-
gories of cases (perhaps the fourth spirit of federal procedure) as well:
There are no simple remedies. The overburdened court
system could hardly tolerate the geometric increase in court
time that would be required to supervise depositions on a
case-by-case basis. There are, however, several alternatives
worthy of consideration.
Much abuse could be curbed by a rule that restricts un-
bridled depositions but that leaves the door open for greater
use of depositions in complex cases through special applica-
tion to the court. One can contemplate a rule restricting the
number of persons who may be deposed and the duration of
each deposition . . . . An exception could be allowed if all
parties consent, thereby exempting complex cases where all
parties must depend on extensive discovery. The court could
also expand the number of depositions, their duration and
any geographic limitations for "special cause."'1 87
The trend to numerical limitations on interrogatories was already
evident by 1981, when the Texas Supreme Court ordered that, without
agreement or leave of court, there could only be two sets of interrogato-
ries, each having a number of questions including subdivisions "so as
not to require more than thirty answers."' 8 The committee members
were most concerned about the effects of lengthy interrogatories in
small cases: "Clearly the drafters intended the rule to protect the small
claimant from being priced out of the litigation market by an overinter-
rogating adversary."' 89 At least one Texan evidently suggested the im-
practicality of establishing a single limit for all cases. 9 "Practically, it
seems ludicrous to impose the same limit on a complex antitrust case as
on a $300 tort claim."' 9 ' By 1981, "at least eleven other states and
twenty-seven federal district courts had adopted their own limits on in-
terrogatories."' 92 As we have seen, at least fifty-four of the ninety-four
federal district courts now also have such limitations.' 93
Many states have been reluctant to try to deal with discovery
187 Depositions Abuse, MAsS. LAW. WEEKLY, Apr. 4, 1988, at 6.
188 TEX. R. CIv. P. 168(5).
189 Note, Coping with the Jekyll-Hyde Nature of Interrogatories by Imposing a
Numerical Limitation: The Uses and Abuses of Discovery Procedures as Exemplified
by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 168, 2 REv. LITIGATION 95, 102 (1981).
190 See id. at 106.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 95 n.3.
193 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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abuse by ad hoc, case-by-case judicial determinations. On June 13,
1983, attorney John M. Mullen of Boston, long a modeling advocate,
wrote to the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court urging the adoption of new federal amendments designed to cur-
tail discovery abuse:...
With vast resources in time and funding available to them,
national bar associations, law schools, scholars and federal
authorities have the federal procedural rules under constant
study and review. It makes elementary common sense for
Massachusetts, with limited resources, to conform its proce-
dural rules, as near as may be, to the federal rules as they
are from time to time amended in the light of study and ex-
perience . . . . It does not make sense to have the strength of
that policy dissipated by delegation of its implementation to
persons who may be interested in attention-seeking innova-
tions or self-serving obstructiveness.
195
The Massachusetts Standing Advisory Committee of Civil Proce-
dure Rules, after lengthy discussions of the 1980 and 1983 federal
amendments relating to discovery and other matters, has been content
to "wait and see" before recommending their adoption:
[Tihe federal amendments are tailored to a federal system,
which, unlike Massachusetts, relies on assigned rather than
circuit judges, and on the availability of magistrates. There is
also a strong feeling among the members of the Committee
that if discovery abuse does exist, there are already a number
of provisions under the present rules to control that abuse,
although such provisions do seem to be underutilized. There
is also concern . . that each time a new procedural device
is added to the system . . . it provides more opportunity to
expand the number of satellite procedural controversies, to
harass the opposition, and to increase expenses and fees.
New procedural steps would also reduce the already scarce
time available to Massachusetts judges to preside over trials
in open court.1 96
19 Letter from John M. Mullen to Hon. Edward F. Hennessey, Chief Justice,
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (June 13, 1983). The new federal amendments
to the discovery rules were to become effective in August 1983.
195 Id. at 1.
19 Memorandum from Standing Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure
to Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2-3 (Dec. 9, 1983). The memorandum also
states:
We are not of the opinion that there should be automatic uniformity with
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Massachusetts is by no means the only replica state to withhold its
adoption of the new federal amendments. Since 1980, Federal Rule 26
has been amended in three major ways, each one designed to curtail
discovery abuse on a case-by-case basis. 97 These amendments represent
the second procedural spirit under the Rules. Only eight of the twenty-
two states in the United States that were considered replica states by
the Oakley and Coon survey have adopted all three Rule 26 amend-
ments. Eleven have adopted none of them. Fourteen out of twenty-two
have adopted the new Rule 11. At this point, there may be only eight
or so current replica states: Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. Ohio, the
most populous replica state, has adopted none of the new rules. Thus,
very little of the population is covered by up-to-date Federal Rules in
state court.198
Further complicating things, the federal local rule phenomenon
has been duplicated by the states. For example, the Federal District
Court of Arizona has local rules covering approximately fifty-eight of
the Project's topics. 99 The Uniform Rules of Practice of the Superior
Court of Arizona cover eighteen main topics and about forty-five sub-
topics.200 But Maricopa County has about thirty pages of "local local"
superior court rules, including rules for different judicial districts: "lo-
cal, local, local" rules perhaps. Over one hundred different "local local"
rules in Maricopa County relate to all cases and civil cases; they cover
many of the same matters that the Project found to be covered at the
federal level.2' Thus, it is unlikely that a lawyer familiar with Arizona
Federal Rules and do not believe in uniformity merely for the sake of
uniformity. We would not recommend significant changes to the Massa-
chusetts Rules of Civil Procedure as they presently exist unless dictated by
reason and experience, and unless such changes would be compatible with
our state court system.
Id. at 3.
117 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
8 One might argue that those replica states that had adopted two or more of the
three discovery amendments and the new Rule 11 provisions have remained in the
"replica" camp; this would add Arizona and Wyoming. If each of the replica states and
the District of Columbia had adopted all five of the Rule 26 amendments and the Rule
11 amendments, that would be 92 amendments. They in fact have adopted 46, or 50%.
The state adoptions were checked as of December 31, 1988, except where 1989 amend-
ments had reached Boston libraries.
9'- See 1988 LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 108, pt. VIII.
200 See UNIF. R. PRACTICE SUPER. CT. ARIZ. (including amendments received
through August 15, 1988).
201 See LOCAL R. PRACTICE SUPER. CT. MARICOPA COUNTY (including amend-
ments received through August 15, 1988). Rule 9 (with its several sub-divisions) gives
rules for the Northeast Judicial District. Rule 10 (with its several sub-divisions) gives
rules for the Southeast Judicial District. See id.
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federal procedure would automatically feel procedurally comfortable in
an Arizona state court or a different federal district court, although all
three systems purport to be governed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or rules patterned on them.20 2 Moreover, this statement does
not consider the standing orders or standing operating procedures of
individual judges, assuming one can find them!
There are other state developments which have the potential to
destabilize modeling and which relate to the emerging spirits of Ameri-
can civil procedure: time standards for the disposition of cases and pre-
defined tracking systems.2"'
On April 7, 1986, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court or-
dered that civil cases with the exception of family law cases be disposed
of "within 24 months after filing. ' 20 4 The order noted the need to at-
tack the "excessive delay and excessive cost" of litigation.205 Former
Chief Justice Edward F. Hennessey explained that:
To succeed, time standards require a substantial change
in the so-called 'local legal culture,'. . . the customary prac-
tices and expectations of both trial lawyers and judges. Un-
fortunately, the 'local legal culture' in Massachusetts . . . is
predicated on the likelihood, if not the inevitability, of delay
in the trial of civil cases. This, in turn, is largely a product
of a chronic shortage of judges ....
To reverse these ingrained expectations, the courts, in
fairness to all litigants, must consistently enforce the time
standards implementation programs, especially with respect
to discovery proceedings ... 2 6
To implement the time standards, the Administrative Justice of
the Superior Court (the highest trial court) issued a "Standing Order."
All cases are assigned to one of three presumptive track schedules: Fast
("F"); Average ("A"); and Accelerated ("X"). Track assignments de-
202 Although the commentaries of John Frank and Janet Napolitano, both Phoe-
nix lawyers, confirm the impression of local rule proliferation in Arizona, Ms. Napoli-
tano describes the work of the Arizona local rule sub-committee in trying to ameliorate
the problem. See Napolitano, Comment on Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State
Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 2063, 2063-65 (1989).
203 The recent Massachusetts experience in these two areas reflects three different
spirits: case-by-case management, absolute curtailment, and non-trans-substantive civil
procedure. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
20 Order of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Apr. 7, 1986).
205 Id.
20" Hennessey, Twelfth Annual Report to the Bar, 73 MASS. L. REV. 3, 11
(1988).
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pend on the nature of the case, although the parties may, for "good
cause" shown, request that a case be designated to a different track.
20 7
The fast track covers certain contract cases and negligence torts;
the average track covers other torts and complicated equitable remedy
cases; the accelerated track covers appeals from administrative agencies,
labor disputes, abuse petitions, mortgage foreclosures, and other miscel-
laneous cases. There are forty-six categories of cases divided up among
the three tracks.
Each track has its own calendar designating the time by which
procedural steps must be completed. For instance, the fast track re-
quires that discovery requests be filed and depositions completed within
ten months of filing, a pre-trial conference be held within twelve
months, and a firm trial date set within the next two months. Thus,
trials are supposed to start within fourteen months of filing. The aver-
age track cuts off discovery at sixteen months, and requires a firm trial
date within twenty-four months. The accelerated track requires a hear-
ing or trial within six months of filing. There is an exception for com-
plex cases that require additional time. 0 8
Tracking dramatically affects discovery without directly amending
the discovery procedural rules. Like the numerical limitations on inter-
rogatories, it embraces the third procedural spirit-specific limits.
Tracking also departs from trans-substantive procedure. It specifically
singles out different categories of cases for different treatment, sug-
207 The case is initially assigned to a track dependent on the nature of the action
as designated by the plaintiff on the civil action cover sheet. See Standing Order No. 1-
88, Applicable to All Counties, Subject: Time Standards, Commonwealth of Mass.,
Sup. Ct. Dept., at 3 (Feb. 1, 1988) (Thomas R. Morse, Jr.) [hereinafter Standing
Order No. 1-88]. California has experimented with tracking cases in which the claim
does not exceed $25,000, by providing for reduced and simpler pleadings, motions, dis-
covery, and trials. See Epstein, Reducing Litigation Costs for Small Cases, JUDGE'S J.,
Spring 1981, at 9, 10; McDermott, Equal Justice at Reduced Rates, JUDGE'S J.,
Spring 1981, at 16, 17-18. For similar experiments in Kentucky and Colorado, see
Chapper, Limiting Discovery, JUDGE'S J., Spring 1981, at 20, 23. There have also
been experiments with "fast track" cases at some appellate courts. See Chapper, Fast,
Faster, Fastest, JUDGE'S J., Spring 1981, at 50, 52-56. A similar suggestion has been
made for tracking at the federal level. See McMillan & Siegel, Creating A Fast-Track
Alternative Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
431, 431 (1985); see also Best, Opening Statement -Where Do We Go From Here?,
LITIGATION, Fall 1988, at 1, 2 (stressing the importance of solving the problem of
overcrowded dockets and proposing study of the fast track concept); Holzberg, Section
Leadership Debates New "Fast-Track" Civil Rules, LITIGATION NEWs, Apr. 1988, at
3, 3 (reporting that McMillan & Siegel's proposals to amend the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to create a fast track for certain civil cases received mixed reviews from
a joint meeting of the Litigation Section Council and Committee Chairpersons of the
American Bar Association).
208 See Standing Order No. 1-88, supra note 207, at 5 ("[T]here are cases which
by their very nature require special tracking standards.").
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gesting the fourth spirit of American civil procedure: tailoring proce-
dural rules in advance for specific types of cases.2"'
Arizona has a uniform set of interrogatories available for automo-
bile accident cases." x0 California has also experimented with uniform
sets of interrogatories for a variety of types of cases.21' Other states
have turned to workers compensation schemes, administrative agencies
and specialized courts, automobile lemon laws, consumer protection
statutes, and malpractice panels-to name a few examples-in an at-
tempt to better mesh process and substance.21 2 Without court rule or
statutory provision, some federal courts have required more specificity
in pleading in certain types of cases, such as anti-trust and civil
rights.213
Most commentators now agree that discovery abuse is not primar-
ily a general problem, but rather is prevalent in a relatively small num-
ber of complex cases in which the stakes are high enough to justify high
fees.214 It also appears that there may be roughly two types of liti-
209 The order also includes aspects of the second spirit: case-by-case management.
Nothing in this Order shall act as a bar to any form of early court
intervention for purposes of screening cases for remand, conciliation, case
evaluation or reference to a master. No later than six months from entry
date, all cases should be examined and appropriate orders may be entered
notwithstanding the previously assigned presumptive track schedule.
Id. at 2.
"I0 See UNIF. R. PRAC. SUP. CT. ARIZ., at XVII app. (Interrogatories 501-93).
21. See Neubauer, Check-the-Box Pleadings, LITIGATION, Winter 1985, at 28, 29,
54 (discussing California's form complaints).
212 See, e.g., Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
93A, § 9(6) (Law. Co-op. 1985) ("Any person entitled to bring an action under this
section shall not be required to initiate, pursue or exhaust any remedy established...
in order to bring an action under this section . . . ."); Gargan, Help for Buyers of
'Lemon' Cars Voted in Albany, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1983, at Al, col. 5 (New York
law requires owners of "lemons" to resort to the manufacturer's arbitration process
before suing for a refund or a new car); Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legal-
ized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 842, 858-59 (1974) (discussing the tension between consumer protection
statutes explicitly providing for class action remedies and the procedural rules regard-
ing the requirements for bringing class action suits); McEttrick, The New Massachu-
setts Lemon Law, MASS. LAw. WEEKLY, Oct. 10, 1983, at 21 (reporting on Massachu-
setts' Lemon Law and provisions to channel cases arising under it into informal dispute
settlement mechanisms).
21 See Subrin, supra note 1, at 984. Also, the Manual for Complex Litigation
applies to some "big" cases. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 10
(1985) (purpose of manual is to set forth basic principles of complex litigation and
describe procedures which have successfully implemented those principles).
214 See, e.g., Levy, Discovery-Use, and Abuse, Myth and Reality, 17 FORUM
465, 468-69 (1981) (most discovery abuses are caused by a small number of giants
involved in large and complex cases); cf. Lord, Discovery Abuse: Appointing Special
Masters, 9 HAMLINE L. REV. 63, 66 (1986) ("In larger and more complex cases it is
not unusual that many months or even years are consumed by pettifoggery.").
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gators: small case and big case lawyers.215 In smaller cases there is less
discovery and correspondingly less dissatisfaction with discovery
abuse.21 Not surprisingly, in those cases that command a large fee,
there is often little incentive for lawyer self-regulation. 17
Authors have listed many reasons why over-discovery occurs:
hourly pay, size of firms and their overhead, obsessive habits, com-
puterization, fear of malpractice, the adversary system, the lawyer's ob-
ligation to the client, and judicial reluctance to sanction. It seems clear
that in complex litigation or in litigation in which much is at stake,
lawyers will frequently over-discover unless policed. 1' Indeed, this un-
derstanding impelled the Federal Rule amendments of 1980 and
1983.219
Courts have been reluctant, however, to manage litigation on an
ad hoc basis; hence, the promulgation of time standards and of local
rules that limit discovery. Some argue, though, that there are cases
which need more lenient or different standards.2 0 Most attempts to
limit discovery permit more discovery by discretion. But there is some
indication that judges are reluctant to allow deviations. 2 1 Moreover,
211 Cf Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. R s. J. 787, 790 (1980) [hereinafter Bra-
zil, Civil Discovery] (arguing that big case litigation is more often infected by abuse of
the discovery system than in smaller, less complex litigation); Brazil, Views from the
Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery,
1980 Am. B. FOUND. REs. J. 217-22 (1980) [hereinafter Brazil, Views] ("The world of
civil discovery contains at least two clearly identifiable, major subworlds [small cases
and large cases] between which there are significant differences.").
21 See Brazil, Civil Discovery, supra note 215, at 799-809; Brazil, Views, supra
note 215, at 223, 232-33.
"11 Cf Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 100, at 277 ("Market economics places a
dominant value on maximization of individual preferences, and optimal economic effi-
ciency may, in a particular case, sanction quite wasteful uses (in the layman's sense) of
litigation resources.").
218 See, e.g., Brazil, Civil Discovery, supra note 215, at 865 ("The vast majority
of big case lawyers believe that the bar simply can not exercise effective control over
discovery in large lawsuits and that only aggressive judicial intervention can curb the
excesses."); Levy, supra note 214, at 472 ("If the parties can abuse the discovery sys-
tem with impunity, it is likely that the abuses will continue."); Renfrew, supra note
99, at 271 ("The growing awareness of the magnitude of the problem of abuse also
should lower judicial barriers to the imposition of sanctions.").
219 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee note (1983 amendments)
("The rule contemplates greater judicial involvement in the discovery process and thus
acknowledges the reality that it cannot always operate on a self-regulating basis.").
"2 See, e.g., Lundquist & Flegal, Discovery Abuse--Some New Views About an
Old Problem, 2 REV. LITIGATION 1, 7 (1981) ("By differentiating the [discovery]
rules, extensive discovery can be allowed when necessary without authorizing overuse
of discovery in all types of cases."); Note, supra note 189, at 106 ("[Ilt may be imprac-
tical to establish a single limit [for interrogatories] to cover all cases." (footnote
omitted)).
221 See Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 100, at 265 & n.82.
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some lawyers believe that some judges are biased against certain types
of cases, which bias is shown in discovery motion decisions.222 As Ad-
ministrative Law Judge Isaac Benkin noted, the question concerning
the amount of discovery that should be afforded is not politically neu-
tral. He found that those who favored government regulation also fa-
vored greater discovery; opponents of regulation tended to prefer re-
strictive discovery.
223
Indeed, many authors have suggested that some procedural rules
(including discovery rules) may have to be tailored to categories of
cases. 224 Courts are driven both to more precise limitations on discov-
222 See Brazil, Views, supra note 215, at 246 (citing civil rights actions as an
example). Such bias may also reveal itself in cases involving other rules. See, e.g., Bur-
bank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1938 (1989) (over one year period in the Third Circuit, civil
rights plaintiffs "were sanctioned at a rate (47.1%) far higher than the rate for plain-
tiffs as a whole (15.9%), and higher still than the rate for plaintiffs in non-civil rights
cases (8.45%)" (footnote omitted)); Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure As A
Vindicator of Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2179, 2182 (1989) (noting the "'sub-
stantive bias' in the contemporary application of procedural rules" against plaintiffs
asserting civil rights claims).
22 See Benkin, The Inconstant Lady: Discovery in Administrative Adjudications
and the Evidentiary Use of its Fruits, 4 ENERGY L.J. 201, 201-02 (1983).
22 See, e.g., Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal
Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 716-17 (1988) (posing ques-
tions why there should not be special rules applicable to RICO, civil rights, and com-
plex cases generally); Cover, supra note 13, at 732 ("It is by no means intuitively
apparent that the procedural needs of a complex antitrust action, a simple automobile
negligence case, a hard-fought school integration suit, and an environmental class action
• .. are sufficiently identical to be usefully encompassed in a single set of rules
...."); Lundquist & Flegal, supra note 220, at 7 ("[D]iscovery rules should be re-
vised to fit the particular nature of litigation in specialized areas. Discovery rules in
antitrust cases inherently need to be different than rules for less complex civil litiga-
tion."); Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REV.
243, 243-44 (1984) (the use of "a monolithic set of rules applied to virtually all the
varied types of civil actions filed in the federal district courts" compounds the problems
that interfere with goals of speedy and inexpensive dispute resolution); Sander, Vari-
eties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE
IN THE FUTURE 65, 84 (A. Levin & R. Wheeler eds. 1979), and reprinted in 70
F.R.D. 111, 131 (1976) (speculating on a Dispute Resolution Center of the future
where a screening clerk would direct the litigant to the process most appropriate for her
case); Subrin, supra note 1, at 991 ("There exist substantially different types of cases
that may warrant different processes."). The idea of separate tracks for different types
of cases is by no means new. In 1967, Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter to the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, suggested that as part of a research project there be:
an attempt to classify the various types of court-litigated matters by their
intrinsic qualities and functions with a view to deciding whether the uni-
tary court procedures now in vogue could be deliberately altered to accom-
modate better to the several types. The general advantages of a unitary or
common procedure are evident, but they may be overborne by other con-
siderations in certain classes of cases.
Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to Dean Acheson, Esq. (March 2, 1967). This letter is
reprinted within this issue as an appendix to Burbank, supra note 222, at 1964.
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cry, and to non-trans-substantive procedural rules. The general, flexi-
ble Federal Rules permitted lawyers to take advantage of the system,
particularly in the large case. Therefore, attorney latitude gave way to
flexible case-by-case management. Neither judges nor lawyers wanted
every decision to be ad hoc. This concern led to absolute standards,
with exceptions for good cause. But absolute standards may prejudice
different cases.225 Such thinking leads to non-trans-substantive rules.
IV. LESSONS FROM UNIFORMITY AND DIVERGENCE
Nine years ago, shortly after I first started investigating the histor-
ical background of the Federal Rules, I wrote in an op-ed piece that
"[a]pplying the rules to all cases, big and small, has proved disas-
trous. . . . We need a less-expensive process. Otherwise, ordinary dis-
putes will continue to blossom into federal cases." '226 Seven years ago I
concluded a short article on the proposed Rule amendments with
questions:
[I]t is critical to ask what cases and clients will be
thwarted or aided by our deceptively neutral procedural
choices. Will new signature requirements and discovery lim-
its chill creative legal theories and legitimate litigation? Will
emphasis on pre-commencement factual and legal investiga-
tion prejudice citizens who have fewer resources?
The debate over the 1981 proposals should be extended
to include basic policy questions, for our procedural choices
will necessarily be as value laden as those of our
predecessors.227
Senator Walsh and Connor Hall made sense to me when I first
read them; they still do, although now I have also found George Dike
of Boston.228 Acutely aware of my own predilections, I offer some les-
sons from the fifty years of uniformity and divergence under the Fed-
eral Rules.
226 See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text. The more the Rules become
biting, the more the need to protect specific types of cases from the bite. The losing
battle to amend Rule 68 was instructive. It became clear that certain types of cases and
litigants would be disproportionately adversely prejudiced by the proposed amendment.
A trans-substantive rule would not work fairly. See Burbank, Proposals to Amend
Rule 68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 425, 438 (1986).
226 Subrin, The Law And The Rules, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1979, at A23, col. 4.
227 Subrin, supra note 122, at 1651.
228 See supra notes 177-84 and accompanying text. For other critics of the Federal
Rules, see Subrin, supra note 1, at 992-1000.
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A. Interdistrict Court Uniformity
Senator Walsh and Connor Hall were correct: uniform federal
rules have not led to as much procedural uniformity among the districts
as Enabling Act supporters suggested. The country is too large and the
judges, local rules, and legal cultures too diverse to permit the adver-
tised uniformity. It is unlikely that a lawyer familiar with the proce-
dure in one federal district court will feel equally comfortable with the
procedure in another.2 29
B. Federal District Court Judge Independence
It is difficult to force a federal judge, or a group of them, not to
have a local rule, standing order, or standing operating procedure if he,
she, or they want one. Different judges will have different views about
how to run their courts. Connor Hall emphasized the independence of
the federal bench, and experience under the Conformity Act and the
Enabling Act are consonant with such independence. A telling ex-
change between Thomas Shelton and Henry Taft, William Howard
Taft's brother, at 1922 Senate Subcommittee hearings reinforces the
independence lesson:
"Mr. Shelton: Federal practice is not anything like the State prac-
tice at all; . . . is there any way in the world in which you can make
the courts conform to the State practice?
Mr. Taft: I did not think there was any way short of
impeachment."'2 30
C. Intrastate Uniformity
Walsh and Hall also accurately predicted that many states would
stick to their procedural guns. By 1897, the Field Code system had
been adopted in twenty-seven states, including such populous states as
New York, California, and Ohio. As of 1890, 38,000,000 Americans
out of 63,000,000 (60% of the population) lived in Field Code states.
Those data reflect considerably greater modeling than has occurred
under the Federal Rules.23
229 See supra text accompanying notes 30-31 & 98-112; cf. 1920 Rep. Comm.
Unif Jud. Pro., supra note 17, at 514 ("One objection [to uniform procedural rules]
was to any change in the federal or state practice at all because some lawyers might be
inconvenienced in having to learn a new system." (emphasis deleted)).
20 1922 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 11. But see supra notes 113-14 and
accompanying text (for developments that may substantially reduce the number of local
rules; yet hundreds, if not thousands, will still remain).
222 For the states adopting the Field Code, see C. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL
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Nonetheless, the Federal Rules have greatly influenced state pro-
cedure, and they have certainly dominated scholarly thought and the
teaching of civil procedure in law school. But this does not mean, as
promised, that a lawyer who knows the procedure in state court will
thereby know the procedure in a federal court of the same state.232
D. Reciprocal State-Federal Influence
There is a continued cross-pollination between state and federal
procedure, and across state lines as well.233 Future reciprocal influence
may be quite subtle, however. If the federal courts see their primary
function as resolving complex disputes, they may tailor their procedures
to fit that image;234 if the state courts are more concerned with routine
cases, they may emphasize limiting, definitional procedural rules or
summary processes with few procedural steps.235
On the other hand, political considerations may compel the oppo-
site agenda. If, as during the progressive era, the states become the lab-
oratories for social experimentation, one may see much equity-like pro-
cedure in state courts; conversely, one may see in federal courts the use
of formalism to obstruct rather than vindicate rights.23 6
E. General Rules Leading to Specific Ones
One can reduce the number of procedural rules and label them
"uniform" and "simple," but judges will continue to exercise broad dis-
cretion (thus making the procedure uniform in name but not applica-
tion) or will issue rules to limit discretion and standardize the practice.
DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND 14-15 (1897). The
population figures are from H. FIELD, THE LIFE OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 356
(1898) (letter from Thomas G. Shearman to David Dudley Field's brother, Dr. Henry
Field, author).
232 See supra text accompanying notes 98-135, 198-202.
233 See supra text accompanying notes 166-76 (discussing the case of Massachu-
setts) & 192-93 (limits on interrogatories); see also Statement of Duties for Reporter to
an Advisory Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, attachment to letter to the
Chairmen and Reporters of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committees on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (July 28, 1988) ("Examines the state experience in judicial
procedure, giving particular attention to changes which have been made by those states
which have followed the federal rules in adapting their local needs.").
234 The 1980 and 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules already point in that
direction.
235 Cf supra text accompanying notes 204-13 (tracking systems). Moreover, rules
for the exceptional case at the state level may be borrowed from rules for the more
normal complex case at the federal level.
26 For the use of equity-like procedures to create new rights, see Subrin, supra
note 1, at 912-13 (discussing scholarship of Professors Chayes and Fiss). On the use of
formalism to defeat rights, see infra text accompanying notes 262-63.
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Legal training instills in a lawyer a general affinity for rules which
may not be diminished upon a lawyer's elevation to the bench.
Again, procedural history is repetitive. David Dudley Field com-
plained that his simple code of fewer than 400 provisions was brutal-
ized by the New York legislature's massive accretions.28 7 In fact, when
one adds to the original Field Code, as amended in 1849, those statutes
incorporated by reference or not repealed, and those relating to the Jus-
tice and Surrogate courts, there were 2,473 sections to cover approxi-
mately the same topics that were covered in 1919 by the 2,732 sections
of the Throop Code, as amended.2"8 Local rule proliferation may re-
present the same phenomenon.
Once again, Walsh and Hall were right. One can have an equity-
like procedural system, such as the Federal Rules, which looks simple.
As they warned, however, equity required centuries to develop, many
treatises to explicate, and a specialized bar." 9 The procedural system
spawned by the Enabling Act could not ultimately be as simple and
problem-free as the proponents claimed.
F. Legal Culture
One reason that it is difficult for procedural reform to achieve its
stated goals is that procedural rules do not work in a vacuum. Walsh
and Hall warned that one must consider how the procedural rules will
mesh with the legal culture within which they must operate. 40 The
habits and customs of the bench and bar, the procedural rules, and the
economic, social, and political agendas of the lawyers, clients, judges,
and other court personnel interact with one another.241
237 See Letter from David D. Field to Cephas Brainerd, Rowland M. Hall, P.
Van Alstine & James A. Ross, in THE LATEST EDITION OF THE NEW YORK CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CEPHAS BRAINERD AND OTHERS
AND DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 3, 11-12, 15 (1878).
"I See REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE SIMPLIFICA-
TION OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 9-12 (1919).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 51 & 59.
240 See supra text accompanying notes 54 & 58.
241 On how civil procedure has broader socio-economic and professional dimen-
sions, see Subrin, supra note 1, at 966; Subrin, supra note 15, at 311. On the intercon-
nected nature of the human enterprise, see Edmund Wilson's description of the matura-
tion of Jules Michelet as a historian. Wilson quotes Michelet: "'Woe be to him who
tries to isolate one department of knowledge from the rest .... All science is one:
language, literature and history, physics, mathematics and philosophy; subjects which
seem the most remote from one another are in reality connected, or rather they all form
a single system.' E. WILSON, To THE FINLAND STATION, A STUDY IN THE WRIT-
ING AND ACTING OF HISTORY 5-6 (1940) (omission in original).
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G. Uniformity of Result and the Third Procedural Spirit
The uniform federal rules movement started with notions of in-
terdistrict court and intrastate uniformity, and ended up embracing
trans-substantive uniformity.24 2 Federal and state judges voted for local
rules and issued standing orders, and some commentators now applaud
the local divergence. They argue that local rules permit adjustment to
local conditions, facilitate experimentation, and create efficiencies.24
Some argue that the bar benefits when lawyers know where a judge
stands.244
But the current proponents of local rule divergence, like the pro-
ponents of the Federal Rules fifty years ago, tend to undervalue the
most important type of uniformity-uniformity of result. As Hall ar-
gued, a major purpose of procedure is to help substantive law be ap-
plied in a constant fashion.2 45 Perhaps the primary goal of uniform
rules in non-test case litigation should be to help similar cases end up
with similar results in an efficient and economic manner.246
Although Shelton and Clark argued, on occasion, that procedural
law is merely "adjective," a "handmaiden" to justice,247 some Federal
Rules and some local rules considerably influence the results of litiga-
tion or the settlement value of cases. When discovery is tightly regu-
lated by local rule in one federal district court but not in another, are
the litigation results really the same?248 If discovery is as important as
most lawyers believe it is, and if judges are as human as we know they
are, can there be equal justice under law? Can similar cases be decided
in similar ways and with similar results when the discovery rules and
other rules have become so divergent?
Procedural rules, as flexible and as judge-empowering as the Fed-
eral Rules, have always implied non-uniformity of treatment, with or
242 See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
241 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
244 See Flanders, Local Rules, supra note 95, at 268; cf. Flanders, In Praise,
supra note 95, at 35 (noting that the most common complaint the author hears from
lawyers is the difficulty in practicing law where procedures differ widely from judge to
judge).
245 See supra text accompanying note 62.
246 See Subrin, supra note 1, at 982-91.
247 See id. at 962.
211 The advisory committee evidently thought it was important that poorer clients
could afford interrogatories, but not depositions, when they rejected interrogatory limi-
tations. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 543-
44 (1980); supra note 127. In the districts that require a motion for additional inter-
rogatories beyond the limit, clients, some of them poor, will have to pay for the motion.
Some of the motions will be lost and some cases will be lost because of a dearth of
discovery or affordable discovery. Federal judges, like all human beings, are different
and have predilections and biases.
2047
2048 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
without local rules. Recognizing this fact, we should welcome more for-
malized procedural rules. Moreover, this recognition is one reason for
the evolution of the third procedural spirit: an attempt to achieve the
uniformity of application that neither the original Federal Rules nor ad
hoc case management could readily deliver.249
H. The Fourth Procedural Spirit:
Non-trans-substantive Procedure and Political Considerations
The third procedural spirit invites the fourth: different rules for
different cases, or non-trans-substantive civil procedure. When one be-
gins to define procedures more rigorously, it becomes obvious that some
cases need different rules.2 50 Some scholars have suggested problems
with this development.25 ' Before addressing their concerns, two words
of caution are in order.
First, it is not a question of wanting or not wanting non-trans-
substantive procedure. As the exploration of local rule and state varia-
tions has suggested, non-trans-substantive procedure is already here;
some cases already have special pre-determined procedural rules.25 2
Even under the Federal Rules as now written and administered, case-
by-case management may often result in procedure being tailored to
particular cases; in such management, judges may often apply pre-de-
fined procedures to pre-determined categories of cases.25 3
Second, no one, to my knowledge, has suggested a return to a writ
"" There were arguments by the Legal Realists about how formalism can lead to
a lack of uniformity, and how flexible, discretionary rules can help achieve uniformity
of result. I think the arguments are flawed. See Subrin, supra note 15, at 342-43.
250 See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
211 See A.L.I., Study on "Paths to a 'Better Way': Litigation, Alternatives, and
Accommodation," Background Paper 97-100 (July, 1988); Carrington, Making Rules
to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-
Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2068 (1989);
Hazard, Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244-46 (1989); Sarat, The "New Formalism"
in Disputing and Dispute Processing (Book Review), 21 LAw & Soc'y REV. 695, 698,
705-712 (1988) (reviewing DISPUTE RESOLUTION (S. Goldberg, E. Green & F. Sander
eds. 1985)). I believe that Professor Sarat underestimates the potential of formalized
rules (non-trans-substantive or otherwise) to help vindicate rights. One can understand
the political nature of procedure, and seek distributive justice, and also see the value of
definitional legal doctrine. See Subrin, supra note 15, at 338-45:
252 See supra text accompanying notes 220-25.
253 Some judges have told me that they have different pre-written orders available
for different types of cases. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) advisory committee note
(1983 amendments) ("The district courts undoubtedly will develop several prototype
scheduling orders for different types of cases."). "Non-trans-substantive" may be a mis-
leading phrase. As suggested in the text of the next paragraph, it may make sense to
type some cases by substantive law, and others by complexity, the stakes, or the nature
of the litigants or their lawyers.
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system where every cause of action will have a multiplicity of unique
procedural characteristics. 2 54 For the foreseeable future, general proce-
dural rules applicable to all cases will be the backdrop for most formal
litigation. There are many questions in this developing new procedural
era: i) what types of cases need some different procedures; ii) can the
case types be determined in advance; iii) should the case be typed by
the substantive law involved, the degree of complexity, the stakes in-
volved, the nature of the litigants or their lawyers, or might these and
other indicia all be used; iv) what should the procedural differences be,
bearing in mind that the general procedural rules will cover most pro-
cedural steps unless and until modified; and v) who should make the
decisions: legislators, the judiciary, the individual judge, or the
litigants? 55
The first major criticism of the emerging pattern of non-trans-sub-
stantive procedure is that the transaction costs are too high: lawyers
will argue about which category is appropriate, judges will have to
make decisions, and clients will pay for the procedural arguments.
256
This misses the point. Case-by-case management developed because the
transaction costs of procedural rules with broad attorney latitude were
too high. As a result of federal local rules and state experimentation,
the judiciary has already demonstrated that it thinks the transaction
costs of ad hoc case-by-case management are also too high. Judges are
already turning to formal limitations and definitions in order to reduce
transaction costs. This third spirit inevitably leads to the fourth spirit,
non-trans-substantive procedure. The same limitations or formalized
requirements do not make sense for all cases. One could try to solve
this problem by making the new, more definitional rules, such as those
25 See A.L.I., supra note 251, at 88. The description of the common law forms
and their accompanying procedure may itself be a caricature. Many attributes of com-
mon law pleading and practice were common from writ to writ. See S. MILSOM, His-
TORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 38-39, 67-70, 72-73 (2d ed. 1981); C.
REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND 224-28 (1980). But, of course, the writs often did
imply procedures individualized to the specific writ. See F. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO
THE FORUMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 295-300 (1920).
255 The criteria to be used for applying some procedures to selected cases may
prove difficult to define, and, as to some procedures, there may be no clear-cut criteria.
For example, a study of "Early Neutral Evaluation" (ENE) of cases in the Northern
District of California suggests that "there emerges no pattern from the data collected
that would clearly suggest that there are characteristics of either the cases, the attor-
neys, or the parties that a court could use in a consistent and fairly ministerial manner
to decide whether to refer cases to ENE. If the views of the participants are a reliable
guide, ENE appears to be equally well-received along any of these dimensions." Le-
vine, Early Neutral Evaluation: The Second Phase (forthcoming, 1989 J. DISPUTE
RESOLUTION). A short version is printed in 70 JUDICATURE 236-40 (1987).
25 See A.L.I., supra note 251, at 99-100; Carrington, supra note 251, at 2088-
89.
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that curtail discovery, subject to motions for exceptions on a case-by-
case basis. But this entails increased transaction costs, decreased pre-
dictability, and increased possibility of bias against classes of cases or
litigants.1
57
Second, there is a fear that different rules for different cases will
render procedure too political. The current reporter to the advisory
committee, Paul Carrington, stresses the importance of procedural neu-
trality (not favoring or disfavoring types of cases or litigants), and sug-
gests that the "have-nots" will be even worse off if procedural rule-
making is subject to political lobbying.25 But procedural discourse and
reform in this country have always had a substantial political dimen-
sion. I have documented elsewhere the political underpinnings of both
the Field Code and Federal Rules reform.259
The political dimension is not limited to major procedural reform
movements; many individual procedural rules or clusters of rules have
an inherently political aspect, in that they favor or disfavor types of
cases or litigants.260 For instance, flexible, broad, trans-substantive
rules, such as the Federal Rules, particularly prior to the amendments
of the 1980s, permitted (if not invited) the growth of rights for minori-
ties, consumers, and the environment.26' In Title VII employment dis-
crimination cases, both the substantive and procedural law have already
been interpreted or altered by the courts in an integrated writ-like
manner, to the detriment of the rights of the people who were supposed
to be protected by the statute.262 Non-trans-substantive procedure ap-
257 See supra text accompanying notes 220-23. Tracking systems can, and do, per-
mit motions to place the case on a different track. See supra text accompanying note
207. This will entail some transaction costs, but not so much as arguing about and
making ad hoc decisions in each case. On what may be the costs of case-by-case man-
agement, see Kritzer, Grossman, McNichol, Trubek & Sarat, Courts and Litigation
Investment: Why Do Lawyers Spend More Time on Federal Cases?, 9 JusT. Sys. J. 7,
15-16 (1984) (also pointing out the potential difference in legal culture between state
and federal courts). On the dearth of evidence on cost or time savings from case man-
agement, see Resnik, Managerial Judges and Court Delay: The Unproven Assump-
tions, JUDGES' J., Winter 1984, at 8, 10.
258 See Carrington, supra note 251, at 2085-86.
211 See Subrin, supra note 1, at 909-1002; Subrin, supra note 15, at 309-45.
280 See Burbank, supra note 222, at 1938; Carter, supra note 222, at 2183-84;
Hazard, supra note 251, at 2246-48.
281 See Carter, supra note 222, at 2179-80; Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1292-96 (1976); Fiss, Foreward: The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2, 5 (1979); Fiss, The Social and Political
Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 121-22 (1982); Hazard,
supra note 251, at 2246; Oakes, "A Plague of Lawyers?": Law and the Public Inter-
est, 2 VT. L. REV. 1, 2, 11-16 (1977); Weinstein, supra note 164, at 1912.
282 Professors Judith Olans Brown, Phyllis Tropper Baumann, and I are working
on a paper documenting the various areas in which the federal courts, and particularly
the Supreme Court, have interpreted and altered the law to the detriment of those who
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pears in this instance to have already developed, but regretfully to de-
feat rather than vindicate congressionally created rights.
If legislators want the rights proclaimed in statutes translated into
real gains for citizens they will have to consider some procedural inci-
dents when they enact laws.26 Walsh was at least part right; some
procedural rules will require legislative hearings and legislative
votes.264
I. Creative Lawyers and Manipulating Procedural Systems
History teaches that any American procedural model will be modi-
fied by the ingenuity of lawyers who have learned to manipulate the
rules to the benefit of their clients.265 Non-trans-substantive procedure
cannot avoid a similar fate. Fifty years from now critics will surely
complain that some of us who could see the flaws of generality, flexibil-
ity, and discretion were blind to the inefficiencies and injustices of
linedrawing. We will just as surely be accused of undervaluing equity
in the fruitless search for certainty.266
CONCLUSION
The quest to have just laws consistently and expeditiously applied,
while at the same time allowing the exceptional claim or defense of
merit and pursuing the evolution to more humane law, is not an easy
one. Nor are the goals fully obtainable. But why should we spend our
professional lives studying, teaching, drafting, and applying procedural
law, or celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of a bunch of procedural rules,
for a less lofty vision? Some tedious journeys are worth incompleteness.
were given rights by Title VII. Areas we are studying include: definition of prima facie
case and affirmative defenses; burdens of proof; statutes of limitations; discovery; inter-
vention; class actions; Rule 11; attorney fees; standard of review; res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel. The paper will demonstrate some of the ways in which the substantive
law and procedures have been integrated.
263 See, e.g., supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text (giving examples of pro-
cedural rules tailored to specific categories of cases).
264 See supra text accompanying note 55.
211 Specialized pleading at common law, trying to determine what was a "fact" or
the "theory of the case" under the Field Code, and liberal discovery under the Federal
Rules each have provided fertile ground for creative lawyers with clients who could
afford to pay for legal victories that they thought were worth the price.
266 We will not even have to wait that long. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 251,
at 2070 (advocating a greater emphasis on equity in the formation of procedural rules);
Hazard, supra note 251, at 2247 (same); Shapiro, supra note 10, at 1977 (same);
Weinstein, supra note 164, at 1923-24 (same).

